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FBIS-EEU-96-026
Wednesday
7 February 1996

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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-026 *7 February 1996*

CONTENTS

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: FRY's Bulatovic Regrets Sofia's 'Losses' *[Sofia Radio]* 1
Bulgaria: Sofia, FRY 'Key Factors' of Balkan Stability *[TANJUG]* 1
Bulgaria: FRY Signs Military Cooperation Agreement *[Sofia Radio]* 1
Bulgaria: Pirinski, Norway's FM View NATO Expansion *[Sofia Radio]* 1
Bulgaria: BSP's Lilov on Foreign Policy, NATO *[PARI 2 Feb]* 1
Bulgaria: Zhelev Denounces First Year of BSP Rule *[STANDART NEWS 1 Feb]* 2
Bulgaria: Commentary Criticizes Zhelev News Conference *[DUMA 1 Feb]* 6
Bulgaria: Two Combat Ships Sold to Turkish Company *[24 CHASA 2 Feb]* 7

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Atomic Law May Obstruct NATO Entry *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 5 Feb]* 8
Czech Republic: Klaus on 'Argument' With EU Head *[Prague Radio]* 8
Czech Republic: Lux Criticizes EU Agriculture Policy *[Prague Radio]* 9
Czech Republic: Zieleniec on Cooperation With Moldova *[DENNI TELEGRAF 2 Feb]* 9
Czech Republic: Parties at Odds Over Elections *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 2 Feb]* 10
Czech Republic: Communists May Use Compromising Tapes *[LIDOVE NOVINY 5 Feb]* 10

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Official Views Promotion of Minority Rights *[PRAVDA 1 Feb]* 12
Slovakia: MP Criticizes Russian Nuclear Fuel Accord *[NARODNA OBRODA 2 Feb]* 14
Slovakia: Commentary on SIS 'Orientation' Toward Russia *[SME 2 Feb]* 14
Slovakia: MP: Meciar's Reponse on SIS 'Insufficient' *[NARODNA OBRODA 1 Feb]* 15
Slovakia: Candidates for Post of SDL Chairman Listed *[SME 5 Feb]* 15
Slovakia: DU Nominates Candidates for 9 Mar Assembly *[NARODNA OBRODA 5 Feb]* 15

HUNGARY

Hungary: Horn, Swedes To Discuss Combat Aircraft *[MAGYAR NEMZET 6 Feb]* 17
Hungary: State Secretary on 'Crisis' in Gypsy Society *[Budapest Radio]* 17
Hungary: UVM Wants Own Autonomous Region *[Budapest Radio]* 18
Hungary: Vetting Law Amendment Presented to Assembly *[Budapest Radio]* 18

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Croats Reject EU Administrator's Mostar Proposal *[Sarajevo Radio]* 21
B-H: Mostar's Croat Leader Rejects Koschnick Plan *[AFP]* 21
B-H: Mostar's Brajkovic Breaks 'All Contacts' With EU *[AFP]* 21
B-H: Croats Suspend Links With EU Mostar Administrator *[Zagreb Radio]* 21
B-H: Croat Protestors Ransack Koschnick's Offices *[AFP]* 22
B-H: PM Muratovic on Arms, Mostar, NATO Effort *[London AL-HAYAH 7 Feb]* 22
B-H: PM Muratovic Views Return of Refugees, Aid *[Vienna DIE PRESSE 6 Feb]* 23
B-H: Intelligence Official on Arrest of Serb Officers *[Sarajevo Radio]* 24
B-H: Serbs Demand Release of Arrested 'Negotiators' *[AFP]* 25
B-H: Serbs 'Suspend All Contacts' With Federation *[SRNA]* 25

Slovenia: Weekly Analyzes ZLSD Departure *[MAG 31 Jan]* 52

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Kontic Addresses Davos Summit on Sanctions *[Belgrade TV]* 54
FRY: Prime Minister Meets Bulgarian Counterpart *[TANJUG]* 55
FRY: POLITIKA Assesses Christopher's Belgrade Visit *[TANJUG]* 55
FRY: Training of Bosnian Muslims Arouses 'Suspicion' *[TANJUG]* 56
FRY: DS's Djindjic Announces Opposition Meeting *[NASA BORBA 2 Feb]* 56
FRY: Opposition To Demonstrate in Belgrade on 9 Mar *[TANJUG]* 56
FRY: 'Legal Vacuum' in Criminal Law Detailed *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 2 Feb]* 57

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rights Activist Suggests 'Balkania' Federation *[AFP]* 57

Bulgaria: FRY's Bulatovic Regrets Sofia's 'Losses'

AU0602165796 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The military, political, and economic relations between Bulgaria and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] should be fitted into the general architecture for European security—this was the common viewpoint expressed by the two countries' defense ministers following their meeting today.

FRY Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic highly praised the position of neutrality that Bulgaria adopted during the Yugoslav conflict and voiced regret concerning the losses that our country suffered, assessing them at about $5 billion.

At the moment, Pavle Bulatovic is meeting Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev. More details on the meeting can be expected in our newscast at 1900.

Bulgaria: Sofia, FRY 'Key Factors' of Balkan Stability

LD0602232996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2059 GMT 6 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sofia, Feb 6 (TANJUG)—Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov and his Yugoslav counterpart Pavle Bulatovic said in Sofia on Tuesday that Bulgaria and Yugoslavia [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—FRY] were key factors of stability and security in the Balkans.

Bulatovic, who arrived in Sofia earlier in the day on a two-day official visit, upheld Pavlov's initiative for a conference of the Balkan states' defense ministers.

The two ministers agreed that it was necessary to upgrade good-neighborly relations in the region as a prerequisite for stable peace in the Balkans.

Pavlov and Bulatovic also agreed that relations between the two countries and the two armies should be further promoted.

Bulatovic emphasized the importance of Bulgaria's principled policy of non-interference in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

Pavlov said that it was Sofia's policy to build trust and cooperation between neighbors.

Bulgaria: FRY Signs Military Cooperation Agreement

AU0702103496 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 7 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A military cooperation agreement was signed this morning by Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov and Pavle Bulatovic, FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] defense minister.

The agreement was the main goal of the FRY defense minister's visit, which ends today.

As the two defense ministers said after the agreement, another step has been made toward expanding Bulgarian-Yugoslav cooperation, not only in the military sphere, but as a whole.

Bulgaria: Pirinski, Norway's FM View NATO Expansion

AU0702084396 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, we find ourselves in a new era of economic cooperation, in which countries like Bulgaria and Norway have a special role to play, Norwegian Foreign Minister Bjorn Godal said on arrival to Bulgaria. The Norwegian foreign minister is paying an official two-day visit to our country.

The relations between the European Union and the new democracies, problems of security in the Balkan region and in Europe, and the expansion of NATO—these were the main topics of discussion at the meeting between Foreign Ministers Bjorn Godal and Georgi Pirinski. Norway supports Bulgaria's ambition to become a fully fledged member of the EU and the North Atlantic Alliance, the Norwegian foreign minister told his Bulgarian counterpart. The two ministers also discussed the possibilities for improving bilateral relations, which is also expected to be one of the main topics tomorrow, when the Norwegian foreign minister will meet President Zhelev, Prime Minister Videnov, and National Assembly Chairman Blagovest Sendov.

Bulgaria: BSP's Lilov on Foreign Policy, NATO

AU0702105096 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 2 Feb 96 p 3

[Interview with Aleksandur Lilov, member of BSP Supreme Council, by unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "Aleksandur Lilov: Bulgarian Foreign Policy Will Not Change"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [PARI] Mr. Lilov, why did you meet the Macedonian ambassador to Bulgaria?

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[Lilov] The meeting took place according to a mutual agreement. I will probably visit Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], because our center [BSP's Strategic Studies Center] prepares a proposal on founding a Balkan club of intellectuals, which will discuss the region's problems.

[PARI] Did you discuss with the ambassador the president's claim that there is an imbalance in our Balkan policy?

[Lilov] No, this is an internal issue.

[PARI] What is your personal commentary on this issue?

[Lilov] The president is wrong in his general assessment. The Bulgarian foreign policy has not changed and its general priorities will not change. I think that the government is right in trying to strengthen relations with all Balkan countries. Some of the president's conclusions are correct, but the assessment he made is biased and opportunistic, and related to the upcoming presidential elections.

[PARI] How will Sendov's blunder affect the Democratic Left?

[Lilov] It is my opinion that our foreign policy's European orientation does not contradict having good relations with Russia and the Balkan states.

[PARI] Does the Democratic Left have a decision on NATO?

[Lilov] This issue must be discussed in a very responsible and detailed manner, on the basis of thorough preparations. There could be no improvisations on this issue. However, one cannot prepare a uniform assessment of this issue within a short period of time. One must assess in a mature manner what is best for our national security, and how our eventual membership in new structures would affect our traditional contacts.

[PARI] Will you await the results of the presidential elections in Moscow to decide?

[Lilov] I know of no such decision on the part of our party.

[PARI] Will you participate in our presidential elections?

[Lilov] I will take part in the discussion of our governing in order to stabilize it.

Bulgaria: Zhelev Denounces First Year of BSP Rule

AU0602171496 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 1 Feb 96 pp 14-15

[Statement made by President Zhelyu Zhelev on BSP government's rule on 31 January at Boyana Residence: "Zhelyu Zhelev: Where Is Bulgaria Going After One Year of BSP's Rule?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The mass media created preliminary attitudes toward and expectations from this news conference, all of which were incredible and strange, from toppling the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] government—as if governments are toppled at news conferences and not by parliaments—to promoting the president's election campaign.

I would immediately like to point out that this is an absolutely normal news conference, at which I will assess the first year of Mr. Videnov's cabinet and the comprehensive BSP rule.

As far as the suggestions about conducting a presidential election campaign are concerned, I would like to say that no presidential election campaign is conducted in Bulgaria, because it has not started yet. The truth is that an organized antipresidential campaign is being conducted precisely by those who make the most noise.

Precisely they, in an attempt to belittle the criticism toward their government, will try to present this news conference as a part of the presidential campaign. They are doing this regarding everything the president is doing in the implementation of his constitutional duties. However, this propaganda trick is already too old, too much used, and too ineffective.

My position is principled. I am the head of state, directly elected by the people, and I must tell the truth as I see it, regardless of whether anyone likes it or not.

When I criticize Zhan Videnov's cabinet, I do not criticize the BSP Supreme Council and its chairman, but the Bulgarian Government, responsible for the government of the country.

It is not only my right but also my duty to assess the first year of the BSP's rule. Despite the fact that my assessment will have no legal consequences for the government, it is very important from the following point of view: It moves the debate to the public area of civil society and does not allow it to be closed within the narrow framework of party forums and cabinet meetings.

The mass media reported that all issues related to the first year of the BSP's rule will be discussed at a plenum of the BSP Supreme Council. You and I, precisely as

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the large part of the Bulgarian society, will not attend this plenum. Therefore, I will pose the issues at this news conference.

Despite the broadly propagated new method of economic reform, the government was not able to find or implement new goals or means. It moved within the channel in which all governments since 1990 moved, something that can easily be proven through the traditional economic factors.

1. Budget as Basic Indicator of Government's Economic Policy:

The budget that the government proposed and that the parliamentary majority adopted does not contain any new elements. The spirit and philosophy of the 1995 budget did not allow the results achieved by the 1994 economic revival to develop and to assert them as a lasting tendency.

The budgetary policy indeed suffered a total defeat through the unprecedented level of the deficit at the end of the year.

2. Inertness Regarding the Structural Reform:

Under the BSP's absolute hegemony in the executive and legislative powers, Bulgaria lags behind the pace of privatization, something which cannot be logically explained or justified.

The start of mass privatization is being delayed, apparently in a deliberate manner, under the dictate of corporation interests. The preconditions of this privatization were established already in 1994.

At the same time, one is alarmed by the increasing mistrust of private business toward the state, prompted by the desire to interfere, the nonexisting legislative foundation, and the lack of policy toward stimulating the development of private business.

3. Blocking the Reform in Banking:

Instead of adopting efficient measures aimed at strengthening the financial discipline, the government directed its efforts toward changing the management organs, displaying an obvious political bias in selecting the cadres.

At the same time, illegal actions developed in the country—I mean the sadly known "pyramids," which inflicted damage to hundreds of thousands of citizens. The commercial banks continued to accumulate uncollectible credits, covered through refinancing on the part of the Bulgarian National Bank and the State Saving Bank, i.e., through the savings of all Bulgarian citizens.

4. Attracting Foreign Investments—the Greatest Failure of the Government's Economic Policy:

At the beginning of his mandate, Foreign Minister Pirinski declared that economy is a basic priority of our foreign policy. The result that is evident at the end of the first year of the government is more than sad.

Instead of the $1.2 billion promised by the government, only $120 million— one-tenth of what was originally promised and half of that in 1994, entered the country. There is total justification to ask whether this is not a purposeful policy aimed at isolating the country. If this is not so, the cabinet should point out the measures which should make Bulgaria more attractive to foreign investors.

5. Unclarified Relations With the IMF and the World Bank:

Relations with the international financial institutions are the most flagrant example of the total lack of any concept in the country's international economic relations. One year ago, the ministers of the BSP government openly put a question mark over the purposefulness of cooperation with the international financial institutions. The absolutely bankrupt thesis was defended that the lack of such cooperation could be compensated on a bilateral foundation. Afterward, the government grasped the serious nature of the problem, but it was already too late. The IMF and the World Bank are not influenced by how the governmental propaganda in a certain country presents things but by the objective assessment of economic factors. They insisted on immediately resolving the basic problems—implementing the structural reform and strengthening financial discipline.

It appears that the government's failure was most drastic in the sphere of agriculture and land reform.

I do not refer to the economic misunderstanding called "Orsov's collective farms," i.e., a kolkhoz that must function in a free market environment, and with which we must enter the EU.

I do not refer to the doubtful legitimacy of the three-member commission, which only God knows how it is elected, and which should manage the "Orsov's collective farm."

I also do not refer to the land reform that was stopped in an attempt to keep the peasants in a state of dependence.

I shall mention the most simple factor in agriculture, called by people as the ability to divide the hay and give the two halves to two different donkeys, or in other words, the ability to ensure the country's bread and fodder balance. The government failed also in this

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area. It allowed the greatest grain crisis in Bulgaria's history, because it appears that it does not know the most elementary things. It does not know that:

First, no normal country allows the export of grain as long as its bread and fodder balance have not been guaranteed.

Second, no state allows the export of raw materials if its processing facilities are idle, as is the case with our flour mills and fodder enterprises. In addition, the export of the end product (flour and combined fodder) is much more profitable from the economic point of view, and the processing of the raw material ensures the employment of the workers engaged in this branch and leaves enough waste products that could be used in cattle breeding and other spheres.

Third, no government exports grain during harvesting, when prices on the international markets are at their lowest point.

Fourth, in no other state do entrepreneurs and merchants receive such a huge profit at the expense of the producer. According to various commentaries, the profit in this sphere, gained by a small group of privileged companies, amounts to 2 billion leva. I think that this is a revenue that has been illegally seized from those who are entitled to it—the agrarians.

The acute shortage of grain forced the rulers to use the state reserve by the end of December. Apparently we will have to import grain, and I do not want to comment about the price.

The emerging fodder crisis also evokes great alarm. We should not be deceived or pacified by reports certain newspapers are publishing about decreasing the price of meat. Yes, there is a drop in the price of meat, but this is not the result of increased production or improved efficiency, but rather a result of oversupply, caused by the inability to purchase expensive fodder. If now one still can find some fodder, and there still are animals that can be slaughtered, in a month or two the things will be completely different.

I know that nothing could be easier or more convenient than attacking a government in the social sphere, when the country experiences the pain of transition. In such a period, no government can satisfy the social problems of millions of people, which indeed are very difficult to resolve. I could never allow myself to exploit the suffering of the people and the difficulties of the government in a populist manner. However, I cannot ignore the BSP's demagogy during the parliamentary elections, which actually helped the party win the elections. Now, at the end of the first year of this cabinet's tenure, the time has come for drawing the balance.

The generous preelection promises of the BSP nourished great expectations and hopes for quickly resolving the grave social problems such as poverty, inflation, mass unemployment, miserable pensions, apartment shortages, and so on, problems mostly caused by the lag in implementing the economic reform. The expectations for a completely different and new social policy were further strengthened by the fact that, in the so-called White Paper, the Democratic Left government denied everything that was achieved in the social sphere by the previous governments. It withdrew from parliament social bills that were submitted before the elections, and promised its own bills and programs, about which it declared that they were ready before the elections.

One year after the Socialists assumed the government, it is clear that the expectations were in vain, because the social differentiation and misery did not abate, and the people's desperation is even greater. The young people are in a blind alley and social insecurity is growing. This picture is especially sinister in certain regions of our country where unemployment is especially high.

To describe the slowing of the pace of impoverishment as a success against the background of the existing wages, pensions, and social benefits, is at least a deception. Everyone knows that many people have no savings, and sink in debts. To this, one could add the issue of the bread. Regardless of whether one calls it the grain crisis or the grain problem, two alarming facts are evident: the price of bread and flour sharply jumped and continue to increase, while many people are concerned with the possibility of a bread shortage.

At the same time, the government's legislative initiative and the activity of parliament in this sphere are more than modest. More and more important social relations in the sphere of social security and health insurance, protection at time of unemployment, encouraging employment, social security, and so on, are resolved through old laws or sublaw normative acts. The social protection of families and children has not been settled at all through a modern law, despite the international commitments we have assumed.

I will not dwell in detail on the issue of crime. In this sphere the failure of the government's policy is total and admitted by all. If the government cannot guarantee the security even of diplomatic missions and foreign diplomats, I do not think that any commentary is necessary.

It is more important to see why this cabinet failed in the struggle against crime, organized crime, and the Mafia,

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and why it believed that the lizard will bite its tail and cut it off, and then everything will be fine. Instead of killing the lizard, the government waited for it to bite its tail. The government did not want to smash the lizard's head because it was formed by "our people"—members of criminal groups, Mafia members, racketeers, and corrupt officials from the highest echelons of the state power. It is the head of the lizard that is formed by the firm alliance of political power and crime.

You cannot fight against an illness, if you yourself suffer from it. You cannot fight against corruption when you yourself are corrupt, or at least affected somehow by corruption.

In our galaxy there is a beautiful constellation called Orion which consists of several even more beautiful stars. On our sinful earth, this constellation turned into Videnov's circle of "friends."

However, astronomy teaches us that beauty is not the most important quality of a star, but rather its ability to suck...money from all directions. I shall stop here, because everything else I could add belongs to the realm of the justice organs.

6. Foreign Policy

One is alarmed by the lack of balance in the cabinet's Balkan policy. The balanced policy of equally good relations with all neighbors, which was established and conducted after 1990, appears very doubtful today.

There is an overt sympathy for Greece at the expense of Turkey, and a preference for Serbia at the expense of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. All this makes our current Balkan policy ambiguous. Let us take only the hostile attitude of the cabinet toward the East-West corridor, which is very promising and important for Bulgaria, and not only for Bulgaria but for the entire Balkan region and Europe.

Despite the government's assurances that it is against any "axes," "arcs," and so on, the West ever more clearly understands that the government is actually working for the establishment of the Eastern Orthodox Athens-Sofia-Belgrade-Moscow Axis. The assertion of this conviction could have extremely negative consequences for Bulgaria's image and its efforts to be associated in the European structures.

The BSP's foreign policy steps could cause great troubles to our country. I specifically mean the attempts tacitly to change Bulgaria's foreign policy orientation and priorities. This is done in a very unintelligent manner by creating a contradiction between the EU and the West European Union on the one hand, and NATO on the other. The ideas of Foreign Minister Pirinski "to work for the transformation of NATO" will remain forever in the history of diplomacy. This makes our entrance into the EU and the West European Union a very problematic one. In any event, by refusing to submit its candidacy for regular NATO membership, Bulgaria not only is depriving itself of foreign policy and military guarantees for its national security, but also finds itself in a unique situation vis-a-vis the postcommunist states, which had a successful start in 1990. Bulgaria is the only one among those states that has not expressed its willingness to join NATO. The states of the Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), the Baltic countries (Lithuanian, Latvia, and Estonia), and the Balkan states (Romania, Albania, Slovenia, and perhaps also Macedonia), all expressed their willingness to join NATO. Naturally, this prompts our citizens to ask themselves whether the BSP has not relinquished the independent foreign policy Bulgaria has been conducting since 1990. And if this is so, who is the BSP serving? Whose national interests is it serving? Whose tune is it dancing to?

One gets the impression that the BSP, which in the past was the most subservient Communist Party, today is the most retrograde Socialist Party of the postcommunist era. One asks himself whether the party is at all able to conduct a responsible national policy that would defend the country's independence and state sovereignty.

I am not talking about the deep international isolation into which our country is gradually falling because of the unclear, ambiguous, and tentative foreign policy of the government, whose visible results are: —Failing to join the World Trade Organization (GATT's heir); —finding ourselves on the so-called EU blacklist; —dropping from the "New Forum" (NEOCOCOM); —and encountering increasing difficulties in talks with the IMF and the World Bank, something which shows mistrust of the government's reforms.

There also are many other things which refer to the intellectual sphere, such as: —A crude censorship on the part of 20 Positano Street [BSP's headquarters], which amounts to usurping the national mass media; —firing leading journalists from the national electronic media for political reasons; —displaying a negative attitude toward nongovernmental organizations and associations; —trampling on legality (as in the case of the Kurdzhali mayor), or issuing sublaw decrees which contradict the country's laws and Constitution; —desiring to rule through force, rather than through the law; —maintaining a closed and conspiratorial spirit in the work of the government; —and the inability to maintain an elementary dialogue and cooperation with the other state institutions in the name of our national interests.

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All this shows that the BSP is not able to rule the country in a competent and democratic manner. It is not developing as a democratic party of the Western type, and more and more it returns to its totalitarian ideology and communist mentality and reflexes. This will predetermine its total failure as a ruling party. The tales about its high professionalism and competent cadres turned out to be a total bluff. Those who sincerely believed this obviously became the victim of mixing two different verbs—commanding and governing—and two different socioeconomic systems—the command-bureaucratic (or totalitarian) and the market-pluralistic (or democratic) systems. The BSP has enough cadres for the first system, but it hardly exists any longer. On the other hand, despite how weak the positions of the second are, it is beginning to dictate the rules of the market game because of its vitality and dynamic character. This system does not want bureaucrats who command, but knowledgeable and pragmatic politicians. However, the BSP does not have such politicians. Therefore, the BSP's rule is becoming dangerous to Bulgaria, its national security, and the country's national interests and future.

Bulgaria needs a new democratic government which could take the country's fate into its hands and do all that the BSP's government cannot do, so that we could again assume the place we deserve. Otherwise, Europe and the world will cross our name out and will forget us, and they will have all the reasons to do so.

Bulgaria: Commentary Criticizes Zhelev News Conference

AU0602131496 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 1 Feb 96 p 7

[Commentary by Velislava Dureva under the "We Are Here Again" rubric]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last May the president called the journalists together, but warned them not to hope for a party on any lawn, [reference to Zhelev's news conference on the lawn of the Boyana Residence in 1992, when he attacked Filip Dimitrov's government] because he did not intend to celebrate the government's first 100 days in office. Yesterday he again summoned the journalists, this time to meet him indoors, looking out onto the frost-covered, slippery grounds of Boyana, because for some unknown reason he had decided to celebrate the government's first year in office. Zhelev said that this was not only his right, but his duty, and swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

The journalists' predictions came true, for the president said exactly what we expected he would say, and also produced the expected effect. The efficiency factor was far below zero; it was a negative value—for the president.

The president decided to join the upcoming BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] plenum on the subject of the first year of the Democratic Left's government, but he came out with his weakest statement to date. Everything he said—about the murky role of the economic groups, the assault by corporate interests, the grain problem, the stalled structural reform, the lizard whose head was always more important than its tail, the infiltration of corruption at all levels, the group of friends called Orion, the debt owed by the Left to the people's great hopes, the closed, introverted nature of the government, and the danger posed by arrogance—all this has been repeatedly stated by thinking Socialists. Moreover, they stated this in a far more critical, profound, and intelligent manner, without a scrap of profanity, without the slightest intention of all becoming presidents, but solely in the public interest.

The president's expose failed to make it clear whether there has been any economic growth or not. First, he said there had been none, then he said that it had started two years ago; he then claimed that there had been progress, but the BSP had no right "to enjoy the political dividends from it." (!) However, the president's expose made it quite clear that his sore spot is foreign policy, and that this foreign policy has two symbols: Zhelev and NATO. He asserted that the government should not in any way fulfill its constitutional obligations of formulating foreign policy, because, according to the president, he covets these prerogatives for himself. It clearly emerged how irritated Dr. Zhelev is by Foreign Minister Pirinski and how much Zhelev fears Pirinski. This is the same Pirinski upon whom Zhelev heaped praises in various European capitals only a month ago. The reason for Zhelev's fear is easy to guess—the presidential elections. Indeed, who would be glad to have an opponent like Pirinski? Only a strong man, not a weak one.

Speaking the truth and nothing but the truth, Dr. Zhelev lightly dismissed as naive all those who expect him to be a the unifier of the nation, yet at the same time proclaimed himself the only man who cherishes the nation and claimed to be a fighter for and supporter of national consensus. Remaining true to his oath, the president defined the BSP as the most retrograde Socialist party, a former communist party of Janissaries dancing to foreign tunes such as Orthodox axes and lacking any pragmatic politicians. These disclosures are unlikely to provoke a rush of tenderness on the part of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], and they will certainly also disturb the severest critics on the

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side of the Left. As for the claim that "the government is becoming dangerous for Bulgaria," this is the third time we have heard this: On the first occasion, it was leveled against the Filip Dimitrov administration; the second time, it was directed at the Berov administration. Every government that is not to Dr. Zhelev's liking is dangerous. What kind of government will be so safe as to lie close to the president's heart? The answer is every time the same: a new, democratic government—one that Zhelev will finally consent to lead himself.

After the president declared that the BSP is incapable of governing, everyone expected him to suggest something—to the government, as its critic, and to the state, as its head. They waited in vain! Once again, we detected the difference between the dissident and the president. The dissident is entitled to ask questions and does not have to answer them. The president is duty-bound to formulate some kind of acceptable answer before he asks a question. All those present expected the president to answer the question that he asked himself: Where is Bulgaria going? In vain! The expectant journalists came away cheated and dissatisfied. The only question to which we received a comparatively sincere reply was the one about which mistake would Dr. Zhelev not like to repeat. My greatest mistake was to agree to become president, the presidential candidate admitted sincerely. Now he is preparing to make the same mistake again, with alacrity, longing, and self-sacrifice. Power, it seems, is the sort of thing that even a mule will realize that it has made a mistake by agreeing to assume the throne and failing to resist temptation. However, with characteristic stubbornness, this philosopher of dumb creatures will continue to sit on the throne of state.

Bulgaria: Two Combat Ships Sold to Turkish Company

AU0702144396 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 2 Feb 96 p 6

[Report by Rado Paprikov: "Two Combat Ships Sold to Turkey"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two Bulgarian combat ships were sold to a private Turkish company at a pubic auction in Varna on 1 February. The vessels have been in service in our Navy for 30 years. According to NATO classification, they are "Poti" Class antisubmarine ships. The Turks paid $36,800 for each vessel at the auction; the starting price was $35,000.

The vessels were purchased by the Turkish company Yogi Gemi, which plans to melt them down. The same company purchased at an earlier auction in Varna the famous "Smeli" frigate, which was also scrapped by our Navy. The price was $67,000.

Yogi Gemi's only competitor at the auction was another Turkish company—Koptazh. Ten vessels, which have been scrapped, but cannot be moved, were unsold. Among them was the superluxury staff flagship No. 425, which used to host dignitaries such as Todor Zhivkov and Leonid Brezhnev. Its starting price at the auction was $100,000.

Four landing craft had the highest starting price—$125,000 each. In addition, two torpedo boats were offered at the starting price of $20,000 each.

Sources at Navy headquarters explained that the Black Sea Navy is trying to get rid of unneeded equipment. All vessels offered at the auction have been stripped of their weapons. The money received for the vessels will be used to meet at least some of the Navy's needs.

If no new vessels are purchased, by 2000, Bulgaria could have only three combat vessels, Vice Admiral Khristo Kontrov, Navy commander, said.

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Czech Republic: Atomic Law May Obstruct NATO Entry

AU0602181296 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 5 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by "(km, jet)": "The Government Has Renounced Nuclear Weapons by Approving a Draft Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—At the beginning of January, the government approved an atomic law containing a stipulation prohibiting, without exception, any kind of handling of nuclear weapons on the Republic's territory. This is, at the same time, at fundamental variance with the unofficial concepts of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Western diplomats, according to security analysts at the Foreign Ministry, are intimating that, although they do not want the Czech Republic to express its agreement once and for all with the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory, they are asking the Republic not to lay down in advance any legal condition that would preclude this.

"This is an idiotic restrictive condition. We should revise the law so that it does not present an obstacle to us in our admission into NATO," said a member of the diplomatic corps who attended the unofficial talks with Western politicians on the nuclear weapons issue.

The wording of the law, which, first and foremost, lays down the conditions for operating nuclear power plants, can still be altered by the Chamber of Deputies, which will discuss it shortly.

The government draft law on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation—to give it its proper name—contains the preclusive stipulation in Article 5: "The development, production, import, transit, ownership, storage, or any other handling of nuclear weapons or their components, as well as trading in them, is banned."

The senior director of the Nuclear Energy Section at the Trade and Industry Ministry, Miroslav Tvrznik, maintains that the atomic law's restrictive stipulation corresponds to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which the Republic has acceded but whose commitments have not yet been incorporated into the valid laws. According to him, neither the Defense Ministry nor the Foreign Ministry protested against the draft atomic law during the appraisal procedure.

"Maybe the law will have to be amended following our admission into the North Atlantic Alliance. Its present form, however, reflects exactly the Republic's current international commitments," added Tvrznik. Security analysts claim, however, that the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty can be complied with by means of a more moderate stipulation in the atomic law.

Czech Republic: Klaus on 'Argument' With EU Head

LD0602220996 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 6 Feb 96

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by correspondent Lucie Weissova on 6 February; place not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Weissova] As every year, you recently attended the World Economic Forum in Davos. This year, however, you represented a country that is now an OECD member—that is, it is among the most advanced countries in the world. Did you feel that foreign politicians and businessmen treated you differently because of this?

[Klaus] I cannot say that this was a specific selling point or something that was mentioned in a debate. It was, however, quite evident at all of our meetings what the position of the Czech Republic is. I hesitate to comment on this: I wish our journalists were there to see for themselves.

It is funny that in Davos I heard all the time that the Czech Republic was a prototype and an example, and then at home the only point that was discussed was my three-minute exchange of views with EU High Commissioner Hans van den Broek. The argument was conducted in a light manner, and now it is presented in this country almost as an important political debate.

[Weissova] Maybe it was not so important, but it was definitely interesting. I also want to ask you about it because, if we request something, apply for something, it is then not usually a done thing to criticize those to whom the application has been made. Would it not have been wiser to start suggesting changes in the EU only after we have become members?

[Klaus] You should have listened carefully to the discussion, which went on for an hour and a half. My speech, which introduced this panel discussion, contained no criticism of the EU whatsoever. I only said that the Iron Curtain had disappeared and that now we had a curtain made of fabric. Maybe it is made of velvet; nevertheless, it is still there and this should change.

Something, however, happened when I spoke about the EU agricultural policy. Austrian President Klestil and EU High Commissioner van den Broek started to list what the postcommunist countries still had to achieve and, in particular, said that they had to change their

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agriculture. I said: Gentlemen, you should not speak about agriculture because, if I am correctly informed about discussions in West Europe, I am well aware that your agricultural policy is a subject of the greatest criticism, the greatest source of dissatisfaction, and it is generally known that, if the European Union needs to reform something, it ought to be agriculture. Therefore, to quote agriculture as an example of an area in which we will have the greatest problems with adapting, this is a wrong example. I said that it was, of course, legitimate to say that we would still have to make great changes before we join the European Union, but for us this would be child's play, compared to what we had to do to erase the communist regime and all of its institutions. If Mr (?Mily) of CTK describes the incident in slightly different terms, it sounds as though something else happened. This debate was, however, about nothing else but what I have told you, and in this argument we must never give in. [passage omitted]

Czech Republic: Lux Criticizes EU Agriculture Policy

LD0602134796 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 6 Feb 96

[Interview with Czech Agriculture Minister Josef Lux by correspondent Jaroslav Skalicky; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Skalicky] Minister, how important is the role played by agriculture in the overall policy of the European Union?

[Lux] Agricultural policy plays a key role in the EU. It is becoming more and more clear that it will also play an important role in talks about other states' drives toward the EU. It is not just we, but all EU experts who have agreed that the EU's present agricultural policy cannot be maintained for good, that it has to change. There are two fundamental reasons for this. First, it is expensive; second, its system of quotas, licenses, and other instruments keeps preserving the structure, which does not provide excellent entrepreneurs with an opportunity to expand. On the contrary, it keeps poor entrepreneurs going. [passage omitted]

[Skalicky] How successful is Czech agriculture in relation to the EU in the sphere of exports and imports?

[Lux] The important thing is that we have succeeded in preserving a balance as regards basic commodities, such as grain, milk, and so forth. Naturally, this does not apply to our import of special products such as tropical fruit. I think I can say with authority that, given the existing conditions, Czech agriculture has a good chance of holding its ground in this competition. This is why we would see adoption of the present EU policy as a mistake and a regressive step. This is why we expect certain changes with great hope.

[Skalicky] Agriculture has played a key role in accepting [word indistinct] countries into the EU. What are your expectations in this context in the case of the Czech Republic?

[Lux] The Czech Republic has been accepted as the 26th member of the OECD, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. There is no doubt that a report on Czech agriculture has helped us. It was a sort of external audit drafted by OECD experts. The report clearly said that Czech agriculture has come closest to the EU's current level from among all of the postcommunist countries. Therefore, it is clear that Czech agriculture will not represent any problem for the EU because we have come very close to it.

Czech Republic: Zieleniec on Cooperation With Moldova

AU0602132696 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 2 Feb 96 p 2

[CTK report: "Josef Zieleniec: Our Commercial Cooperation With Moldova Is on the Horizon"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—An agreement on commercial cooperation between the Czech Republic and Moldova could be concluded before the end of this year. Further documents could follow its conclusion—namely, an agreement on the protection of investments and on preventing double taxation. Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec and Moldovan Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli, who is in the Czech Republic on a private visit, agreed on this at a meeting in the Cernin Palace yesterday. The ministry's spokesman, Vit Kurfurst, gave a briefing following the meeting. According to him, the two politicians also agreed on their interest in supporting the development of mutual economic and political relations. The Czech Republic, according to Minister Zieleniec, is interested in imparting its experiences to the Moldovan economy and in setting up joint projects, especially in the agricultural sphere. In this context, Zieleniec declared his intention to send to Moldova a team of experts who could contribute to the revival of the Moldovan economy.

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Czech Republic: Parties at Odds Over Elections

AU0602133096 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 2 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by "(ajk, kac)": "The Leaderships of the People's Party and the SD-LSNS Disagree in Their Views on the Method of Electoral Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The leaderships of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] and the Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party [SD-LSNS] continue to disagree in their views on how they should cooperate in the coming parliamentary elections.

While SD-LSNS Joint Chairman Vavrinec Bodenlos yesterday categorically rejected a proposal from the People's Party that the representatives of his party campaign for the electorate's votes on the KDU-CSL's lists of candidates, People's Party Deputy Chairman Jan Kasal utterly renounced the possibility that these two parties would form a coalition.

The KDU-CSL is convinced that the SD-LSNS does not stand a chance as an independently campaigning party of winning at least 5 percent of the vote—the threshold for ensuring that its representatives get into the Chamber of Deputies—in the elections. "The KDU-CSL is interested in making sure that the potential votes of SD-LSNS voters are not forfeited," said Kasal in explaining the proposal to offer places on the KDU-CSL's lists of candidates.

"We have a list of candidates filled with interesting people from all walks of life," declared Bodenlos, however. Despite this, he added that he considers the KDU-CSL to be a party politically close [to the SD-LSNS], and, therefore, he decidedly welcomes its show of goodwill toward his party and its offer of participation in the government.

According to Bodenlos, the SD-LSNS is aware that the results of the parliamentary elections will determine the composition of the new government. Of course, the Constitution does not stipulate that the members of the cabinet have to be deputies or senators. It is therefore possible for a person who is not a politician but who is regarded by the coalition as a first-rate expert to become a minister. The SD-LSNS has already offered important places on its lists of candidates to David Rath, the chairman of the Professional Club of Doctors, and Rudolf Baranek, the chairman of the Association of Businessmen.

Michal Hron, a member of the SD-LSNS Presidium, yesterday denied that SD-LSNS Joint Chairman Jiri Dienstbier agreed on 31 January that representatives of his party should appear on the KDU-CSL's lists of candidates. "Mr. Dienstbier is a diplomat and, as a diplomat, acted in a manner ensuring that he left the back door slightly ajar," said Hron.

Tomas Sterba, chairman of the SD-LSNS Deputies' Club, pointed out that a congress would have to decide on the possible participation of SD-LSNS members on the KDU-CSL's lists of candidates.

Czech Republic: Communists May Use Compromising Tapes

AU0602181496 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 5 Feb 96 p 3

[CTK report: "Communists Detect Their Chance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Miroslav Grebenicek, chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, admitted in Duchcov on 3 February that he will use compromising material against everyone who "hits below the belt." The Communists will conduct a "decent election campaign" but they are not helpless, he added.

He mentioned that "many people are offering him videocassettes and written and similar documents about an entire spectrum of people and events, which are allegedly being kept in safe places." Everything points to their being reliable documents, Grebenicek said, observing that "many things that appeared there have always been subsequently proved." He refused to provide any details about these materials with a reference to the U Holubu Restaurant, where someone was allegedly looking for videocassettes during the raid.

At the same time, Miroslav Grebenicek hopes that in the forthcoming parliamentary elections the Social Democrats will obtain at least as many votes as his party. According to him, the Communists will receive 14-18 percent of the votes. He said that the membership of the Social Democrats, which, according to him, has not yet completely shaped up, sometimes reminds him of "Civic Forum No. 2." Therefore, Grebenicek believes that some social-democratic voters might be disappointed. "If they opted for us, I would not get upset," he added. While Grebenicek wants to appeal to citizens in a decently conducted election campaign, the Party of Czechoslovak Communists (SCK) of Miroslav Stepan will enter the elections with a program for the revival of Czechoslovakia, socialism, and "genuine government of the people who live off the work of their hands." This is stated in the report of the Saturday session of its Central Committee. The SCK offers an

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alternative of the state as the largest entrepreneur and taxpayer, which will secure citizens the right to work, security, housing, and free health care. On the other hand, it definitely opposes the Czech Republic's joining NATO, Germanization, anticommunism, and fascism.

SCK Secretary General Miroslav Stepan informed the Central Committee session that the party, which emerged last March, has more than 19,000 members now and that more than 14 percent of Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia members sympathize with them. The Central Committee also discussed the SCK election program entitled "Czechoslovakia-Work-Socialism" and approved its constituency election leaders. Stepan will be the leader for Northern Bohemia.

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Slovakia: Official Views Promotion of Minority Rights

AU0602174996 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 1 Feb 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Foreign Committee and deputy chairman of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, by Jan Skoda; place and date not given: "Recommendation No. 1201 Is Outdated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Skoda] At the meeting of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, you became its deputy chairman. What does this post mean for the promotion of interests of the Slovak Republic?

[Slobodnik] The deputy chairmen, together with the chairman of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the secretary general of the Council of Europe, and the chairmen of individual political factions, form the so-called bureau, which actually decides on the activities and program of the Council of Europe. Of course, one can explain and advocate numerous Slovak stances also in the lobby of this more than 20-member board.

[Skoda] Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, introduced several initiatives to the plenum of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. On the basis of what impetus can the Strasbourg authorities deal, for instance, with the proposal to prepare the so-called white book on minorities?

[Slobodnik] The issue of ethnic minorities is, at any rate, one of the key problems with which the Council of Europe deals within the framework of the protection of human rights. The Council of Europe adopted in the past the so-called Directive No. 508, which states that all the member states should demonstrate—it applies specifically to Recommendation No. 1201—how they implement this resolution. After all, it is normal that a comparative study is prepared—and that also is the idea of the white book—so the standard of rights of the ethnic minorities in individual European states can be established. That is the only way to move on. The view is clearly dominant in the Council of Europe, however, that the main document in this sphere is the "Framework Agreement on the Protection of Ethnic Minorities." In the session of the Joint Committee, it was observed that Recommendation No. 1201 fulfilled its role because it was necessary to activate the issue of ethnic minorities, create some fundamental criteria, but it is in a way outdated and is now replaced by the new Council of Europe document.

[Skoda] What are the chances that the proposal by Gasparovic will become a binding document of the Council of Europe?

[Slobodnik] The chances are great enough. Our delegation will support this proposal at all meetings. I believe that such a comparative study, based on facts, on identical questionnaires, on visits to the states and discussions with minority representatives, could be prepared by the end of 1997.

[Skoda] Slovakia also subscribes to the opinion that the Council of Europe founding members be subject to monitoring the status of ethnic minorities, as well as the new members....

[Slobodnik] Yes, that is what we advocate. The founding countries are also bound by Directive No. 508. We want the monitoring to take place but not on the basis of some "punitive expedition." If the Council of Europe wants to decide responsibly on the issue of ethnic minorities, it is in its own interest that a study is conducted everywhere, as proposed by Gasparovic. It is necessary to prepare a questionnaire, which the Slovak Republic will draft on the basis of its own experience. Of course, it will not do this on its own. We will join forces with Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Poland, and other countries, and we will submit a proposal. The study can be conducted without the actual physical presence of the researchers. The issue in question is to finally break the stereotype of checking on Central and East Europe. The European Union should take its hat off to the Slovak stand regarding ethnic minorities and learn from Slovak experience. That is because the standard of individual rights—and they do not want any other—is so high here that Europe, many of its states, could consider themselves fortunate if they reach it.

[Skoda] "The Framework Agreement on the Protection of Ethnic Minorities" will become a valid document of the Council of Europe only after it is ratified by 12 countries. To date, only four states have done so. When do you expect this condition to be satisfied?

[Slobodnik] It is well known that governments in general dislike ratifying particularly multilateral agreements concerning the issue of ethnic minorities. Namely, very few states satisfy all of the requirements. According to the representatives of large states, however, the Council of Europe will have collected the 12 states to ratify the agreement. That is also the fate of other Council of Europe documents. The European charter of regional and minority languages, for instance, has been signed by only about five states and ratified by even fewer Council of Europe countries. It is paradoxical that they include Hungary, which apparently believes that its standards concerning fulfilling these requirements are ideal.

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It really is necessary to send an inspection team to that country to ascertain what is theory and what practice. In theory, Hungary is the most progressive state regarding the question of ethnic minorities. Unfortunately, the practice is different, as can be documented not only on the status of the Slovak ethnic minority.

[Skoda] Slovakia adopted the Framework Agreement as the European standard in the sphere of rights of ethnic minorities....

[Slobodnik] The Framework Agreement is for us the final destination. Slovakia will not go beyond the individual rights because, as I have learned from various representatives of foreign circles, a new stage of Hungarian steps aimed at territorial autonomy has just begun. Under no circumstances will Slovakia accept this.

[Skoda] The Council of Europe experts recommended to us that we immediately join the European charter of regional and minority languages. Another possibility is to adopt a law on using the minority languages. Which of the two options do you prefer?

[Slobodnik] The charter has its great pitfalls. We are currently observing some 90 percent of the items of this charter. There are several items, however, where the individual states do not have the option of their own choice. Therein are the pitfalls. Numerous states decided therefore not to adopt the charter right now. Perhaps if we view it again from the point of view of the new law—currently in the works—on minority languages, it may not seem all that terrible. For me, I believe that the law on minority languages will be adopted in our parliament first. The law will not stop short of the standard of rights implemented in the country so far. This means that it will not be a restrictive law. It is quite certain that the 20-percent limit on the percentage of the population in the community belonging to an ethnic minority to facilitate contacts with authorities in that language will remain unchanged. In Hungary, however, Law No. 77 was adopted in October 1993, according to which each of the 13 minorities has a representative in the parliament. Following the 1994 elections, the law was not implemented. We will insist in the Council of Europe that the researchers check into the implementation of this law.

[Skoda] What will then be the fate of Recommendation No. 1201 of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly?

[Slobodnik] Regarding Recommendation No. 1201, the Council of Europe got itself into an impasse. This was also observed by the author of the new minority proposal, German socialist Rudolf Bindig, who said that dealing with Article 11 is difficult, and that therefore the Council of Europe will turn to the Venice commission of attorneys at law, which could issue in April its verdict on how to interpret Article 11. Mr. Bindig will appear in the Council of Europe and present a preliminary report based on the decision of the commission in June. The final report can appear by the end of the year.

[Skoda] Could this verdict be the reason for postponing the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty in the National Council of the Slovak Republic?

[Slobodnik] Our solution consists of the submission of the treaty for ratification in March together with a resolution to be prepared in the Foreign Committee on the basis of counsel of the Council of Europe legal experts. This resolution, understandably, will be binding not for Hungary but for the Slovak Government.

[Skoda] The most important item on the agenda of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly was the admission of Russia as a member of this Pan-European organization. Russian human rights activist Sergey Kovalev expressed the opinion that the admission of Russia will render more difficult the responsibility of Europe for the observation of human rights, a burden that it could not bear so far even in the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[Slobodnik] A report has been making the rounds in Strasbourg, according to which Kovalev, on the contrary, appealed for the admission of Russia into the Council of Europe. The only big problem to date has been Chechnya and that Russian troops were engaged there last year. The situation has changed a bit in the meantime. They are terrorist attacks, to which any state must respond. I believe that the vote in favor of admitting Russia was the right decision. In a brief speech before the vote, I pointed out one new moment: If we compare the postcommunist states regarding the progress in democratic institutions, Russia certainly is not the last one. There is absolute freedom of speech in Russia, just about like in Slovakia, freedom that does not exist in the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland, and the level of this freedom is not as high even in the Western countries. There is freedom of religion in Russia, freedom of assembly, and they have free elections. These are the four freedoms, the presence of which makes it impossible to say that the country is not free. The problem of Chechnya is tragic, no one approves of it, and I am convinced that it will be resolved.

[Skoda] In our last interview at the end of last year, you said in connection with the bill on anticommunist resistance that you will abstain from voting. Have you changed your mind since then?

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[Slobodnik] My answer is still the same. I am in favor of drawing a thick line under the past, similar to what happened in Spain.

Slovakia: MP Criticizes Russian Nuclear Fuel Accord

AU0602174796 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 2 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Martin Kovacic: "M. Dzurinda: Government Concluded With Russia an Agreement That Gives It Monopoly on Nuclear Fuel Supply"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—At yesterday's news conference of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], KDH Deputy Chairman Mikulas Dzurinda said, among other things, that he got hold of an intergovernmental agreement between Russia and Slovakia, in which the Slovak side undertakes to import nuclear fuel exclusively from Russia.

In an interview for NARODNA OBRODA, Mikulas Dzurinda provided more detailed information on the agreement: "Its official name is 'Agreement on Assistance in the Completion of the First Two Units of the Mochovce [Nuclear] Power Plant.' However, when I got hold of the agreement, I saw that it was about something else. The gist of the agreement dwells in the provision of absolute exclusivity or, said differently, total monopoly to the Russian side on supplies of nuclear fuel for all Slovak nuclear reactors for their entire service life. Moreover, the agreement lacks a clause providing for the possibility of its abrogation," Mikulas Dzurinda said. He described as piquant the fact that the agreement is in contravention of two government resolutions on diversification [of energy supplies], adopted by Vladimir Meciar's second government in 1992 and 1993. On the basis of these resolutions, Slovenske Elektrarne [Slovak Power Plants] organized an international tender for supplier of nuclear fuel in order to spread the risk and secure competition.

"The appraisal of bids shortlisted in this international tender, which were from energy giants such as Westinghouse, Siemens, and Feratom [as published], was planned for 31 January 1996—that is, two days ago. According to my information, no decision has been made yet. It needs to be said, however, that, following the signing of the above agreement, this tender is pointless. Even if a winner were formally determined, he would have nothing to deliver, in fact, and only the threat of an international scandal is left," Dzurinda said. He drew attention to the fact that the international standard, customary in all advanced countries, was to diversify energy sources in order to spread the risk and prevent monopolization and one-sided dependence. "Each monopoly means threat to the stability of supplies, pressure to raise prices, and reduction of the quality of supplies. Competition, on the other hand, limits all of those risks."

To furnish evidence of his words, Mikulas Dzurinda mentioned that, at the time the government decided to organize the tender, the price of nuclear fuel dropped 15 percent at one go. "Today, however, when the sole supplier asks a higher price, which is warranted by the contract, we have no choice but to pay this higher price," he warned.

The KDH deputy chairman said in conclusion that he would again interpellate Prime Minister Meciar in this matter because his first written interpellation was not answered by Meciar but by a section chief at the Ministry of Economy. "This is an intergovernmental agreement. I will therefore openly and publicly interpellate the prime minister, still during the current parliament meeting, and demand that he reply to my questions publicly, openly, and in person," Mikulas Dzurinda said in conclusion.

Slovakia: Commentary on SIS 'Orientation' Toward Russia

AU0602175196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 2 Feb 96 p 4

[Commentary by Peter Toth: "The Slovak Information Service and Its Partners"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the publication of reports about the visit to Moscow by senior Slovak Information Service [SIS] officials, no explanation of this occasion was issued by any of the authorities. No one, as is the custom in similar instances, has protested against the repeated disclosure of this information. Not even the Russian side has attempted to deny the fact that the visit to Moscow by the most senior SIS officials is a personal success for Valeriy Zarubin, a Russian intelligence staffer operating officially in Slovakia. This man can also credit to his successes the unequivocal orientation toward Russia of the Slovak secret service, although this inclination is just a natural consequence of the workings of the political subconscious of the head of the secret service, I. Lexa, and the director of counterintelligence, Jaroslav S.

It is no longer a secret in diplomatic lobbies that cooperation between the SIS and Western intelligence services in the campaign against organized terrorism has been broken off since Lexa assumed his post as head of the secret service. Our secret service has thus opened itself up to cooperation with a Russian intelligence service expanding into Central Europe. These facts, in addition to the distinctive Slovak democratic folklore, are also important signals for Western governments, on

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whose basis they judge Slovakia. Undoubtedly, this will also influence their stance toward our aspirations for membership in the EU and NATO.

On the other hand, the Russian intelligence service certainly cannot be pleased with its partner, which does not know how to guarantee the discreet nature of their mutual (delicate) relations.

Slovakia: MP: Meciar's Reponse on SIS 'Insufficient'

AU0602133196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 1 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "Ladislav Pittner Will Present to Parliament New Reasons for Concern Over Slovak Information Service Activity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—As Ladislav Pittner, Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] deputy and former minister of interior, told NARODNA OBRODA yesterday, he considers the reply he received from Prime Minister Meciar to his interpellation concerning the suspicion that the Slovak Information Service [SIS] is abusing its powers to be insufficient. In the interpellation, Pittner asked the prime minister whether it is true that the SIS is establishing a so-called section for special operations—that is, an operations commando—and that the former StB [communist-era secret service] network is being brought back to life on an all-Slovak scale. In his letter of reply to Pittner, Meciar states that he gives a negative reply to questions formulated in this way; that responsibility for supervising the SIS is not borne by the government and its prime minister but by parliament through OKO [special parliamentary body for supervising the SIS]; and that he is convinced that SIS does not act in contravention of the Constitution and laws of the Slovak Republic. However, Pittner pointed out in this context that the prime minister is at the same time chairman of the State Defense Council, which is assigned certain tasks by the law on SIS, and, "if these tasks evolve in a different direction, the prime minister ought to take exceptional interest in it." Besides, the organizational structure and the statutes of SIS are approved by the government.

In reaction to Vladimir Meciar's reply, Ladislav Pittner is planning to present to the current meeting of parliament new reasons, owing to which he considers the reply unacceptable. He said that new information from the SIS environment not only confirms but even deepens his previous concerns. Personally, he is of the opinion that the information that has appeared in the press regarding the possible participation by SIS in the abduction of Michal K. Jr. should prompt the government and parliament to strive to clarify the situation. "The present state of boundless activity by SIS, which is not controlled by the opposition, is alarming. This alarm was expressed even by members of the European Parliament during their visit to Slovakia," Ladislav Pittner added.

Slovakia: Candidates for Post of SDL Chairman Listed

AU0602182296 Bratislava SME in Slovak 5 Feb 96 p 2

[CTK and TASR report: "P. Weiss Should Become the Deputy Chairman of the SDL, for Which the Current Method of Power Is Unacceptable"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] With regard to the issue of the Socialist International's view on the possible entry of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] into the ruling coalition, the party's chairman, Peter Weiss, said that the current method of ruling power is unacceptable to the SDL. Government policy would have to change considerably. The actual nature of such a change, however, does not depend on the SDL. Weiss means to give up his post as SDL chairman; nevertheless, he intends to campaign for the post of deputy chairman and, at the same time, should devote himself to foreign issues. On the list of candidates for the post of chairman, which the SDL has submitted for a precongress discussion, are Robert Fico, Lubomir Fogas, Pavol Kanis, Peter Magvasi, Jozef Migas, and Brigita Schmognerova. Another 16 party members, among whom are P. Bohunicky, A. Borzova, L. Dzurak, V. Falc, J. Horvath, V. Sopko, and J. Zselenak, will compete along with Weiss for the posts of deputy chairmen.

P. Kanis pointed out in yesterday's discussion that the party had "not paid sufficient attention to the issues of power." He emphasized that it is necessary to define clearly in the policy documents what the party will do in the opposition and what it will do in the event of participation in the coalition. B. Schmognerova referred to the necessity of drafting special action programs to solve the problems of pensioners, workers, and small shareholders, who are helpless in the matter of coupon privatization and bonds.

Slovakia: DU Nominates Candidates for 9 Mar Assembly

AU0602182196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 5 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "Jozef Moravcik Sole Candidate for Post of Democratic Union Chairman, for the Time Being"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—The assessment of the general political situation in Slovakia, analysis of

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the work of Democratic Union [DU] deputies in parliament, and preparations for the national DU Assembly in March were on the agenda of the 3 February meeting of the DU Republic Board in Bratislava. [passage omitted]

Within the framework of preparing the national assembly, which will be held in Bratislava on 9 March under the slogan "Citizen first," members of the DU Republic Board decided on the method of appointing delegates and electing party bodies and officials. The sole candidate for the post of DU chairman is, for the time being, Jozef Moravcik. The number of DU deputy chairmen—four—should remain unchanged. All incumbent DU deputy chairmen, with the exception of Ludovit Cernak, are running for reelection. In addition, Eduard Kukan and Anton Hrnko are also candidates for these posts. Jozef Moravcik expects the number of candidates to expand further until the assembly.

In an interview with the NARODNA OBRODA correspondent, Ludovit Cernak explained his decision not to run again for a top party post, with the intention of gaining a specialist rather than a political profile in the party leadership in the coming term. The second reason is that he does not want to become a "catalyst of supporters and the emergence of dividing lines in the party." While personally he is convinced that "a specific post benefits from two or three strong candidates," he believes that "conditions must be created for such a healthy competition, and there must not be confrontation." Asked about behind-the-scenes talk that he was seeking the post of DU chairman and was engaged in the appropriate activities, Ludovit Cernak conceded that there had been moments when he considered running for the post of chairman because he felt that "healthy competition must set everyone in motion and that the party chairman should have to fight for the post." However, he stressed that he did not discuss this issue with anyone, was not lobbying, and was not engaged in any activity. Asked whether he agrees that, when there is only one candidate, the impression is created that something is wrong with the party, Cernak replied: "No comment."

DU Deputy Chairman Roman Kovac, on the other hand, sees therein a certain expression of stabilization in DU. He perceives the nomination of the present chairman as the sole candidate as an expression of confidence and satisfaction with his work. [passage omitted]

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Hungary: Horn, Swedes To Discuss Combat Aircraft

AU0602182096 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 6 Feb 96 pp 1, 3

[Correspondent's report: "Gyula Horn To Travel to Stockholm—He Will Also Discuss the Gripen Issue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Gyula Horn leaves for Stockholm on 6 February. In addition to meeting his host, Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and other leading Swedish politicians, Gyula Horn will also meet with Peter Wallenberg, head of Sweden's biggest financial group. The idea that Hungary should modernize its Air Force by purchasing JAS-39 Gripen combat aircraft manufactured by SAAB will probably receive special emphasis at this meeting. The Hungarian Government is expected to decide on this matter in December 1996, and it must choose among the Swedish, U.S., and French offers.

Paris is offering Mirage-2000 aircraft, while Washington is offering F-16's to Budapest. According to retired Major General Istvan Schmidt, any of these types of aircraft fulfills the requirements of the Hungarian Air Force, both regarding air defense and support for land troops. Each type has its own advantages and disadvantages. According to the official of the Security Policy and Defense Research Center, the main issue is how to modernize the equipment of our Air Force in an acceptable way and in harmony with Hungary's economic situation. It is impossible to purchase a tactical combat aircraft for less than $20 million today.

The current state of the Hungarian economy does not make it possible to carry out an aircraft purchase deal on a solely commercial basis, namely, that the supplier brings the goods and the treasury pays the purchasing price. This would present serious problems even if the partners offered special conditions. Istvan Schmidt thinks that the only solution is to come to an agreement with the future supplier on a system that makes it possible for the whole, or at least the bulk of the budget funds used for the purchase of aircraft to remain in Hungary. At the same time, we must guarantee the widest possible involvement of the domestic industry in production and assembly, if possible, in a way that does not only refer to the combat aircraft manufactured for Hungary. Thus, we must create broad industrial, economic, and financial cooperation, and the Hungarian profit deriving from this should cover the bulk of the aircraft purchasing price.

The Wallenberg group has been engaged in its offensive regarding the Gripen aircraft for years, and they proposed broad cooperation in their offer handed over to the Hungarian prime minister in the form of a declaration of intentions. Among other things, the Wallenberg group took it upon itself to spend most of its income on purchasing Hungarian products. They started their cooperation with the Duna Aircraft Factory in this framework, too: The Swedish group supplied modern machines at very advantageous prices, and the factory in question has already started to produce certain spare parts. Istvan Schmidt did not hear of any similar offer from the Americans or the French. According to press reports, the Americans offered the least up-to-date version of F-16 combat aircraft, and used ones at that, but under advantageous financial conditions. However, if Budapest decides to take this offer, it must take it upon itself to continue to purchase combat aircraft from the United States.

As for the assumptions that the Americans would strongly support Hungary's NATO membership if we struck a deal with them and that Sweden would strongly support Hungary's EU membership if we struck a deal with them, Istvan Schmidt thought that these promises had not been voiced; they only made it into the public awareness somehow. "Naturally, every government supports its own economy, but if we regard as serious everything they say about NATO as a political and military organization or about the EU in the world, the aircraft purchase issue cannot be decisive for our integration"—Istvan Schmidt added. In his view, this is a "distorted concept," just like the idea that our role in Okucani and Taszar directly leads Hungary into NATO. "Surely enough, these steps can advance the process, but it is a mistake to claim that this guarantees our membership"—Istvan Schmidt pointed out.

Hungary: State Secretary on 'Crisis' in Gypsy Society

LD0702114096 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0545 GMT 7 Feb 96

[Interview with Csaba Tabajdi, political state secretary at the prime minister's office, by unidentified correspondent at the Kossuth Radio studio in Budapest—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent] We have heard little so far about the Hungarian Gypsy Public Foundation, whose curator is about to be established. Csaba Tabajdi, political state secretary at the prime minister's office [in charge of minority affairs], is called gypsy minister by his constituents—behind his back. Why? [passage omitted]

[Tabajdi] [Passage omitted] Since assuming my current post 18 months ago, I have spoken several times about the crisis situation of the Hungarian gypsies. This government has decided to face the fact, however

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sensitive this issue is, that the 500,000-strong gypsy community in Hungary is in deep crisis.

The entire Hungarian society is in a crisis, but the principal losers of the country's transformation to a market economy are the gypsies. This is the case because in the past a gypsy worked in an agricultural collective or in a plant as an unskilled or skilled worker—he had a status, he had a job.

During the transformation to the market economy, those who were less qualified lost their jobs first. As a result, the gypsies are again nothing but gypsies, i.e., no longer Mr. Tractor Driver or Mr. Factory Porter. They have suffered not only social degradation, but this market-economy transformation has also made them rediscover their gypsiness. This is a very dangerous process that must be faced in Hungary because it has led in many regions, including Borsod, Szabolcs-Szatmar, or Heves Counties, to so serious conflicts recently that its resolution is very important to long-term social peace in the country—it is in the national interest.

[Correspondent] The government decided to set up this foundation last November. What are the specific objectives?

[Tabajdi] The reason behind the creation of this foundation is the realization that, at a time when from 35 to 40 percent of Hungarian society live at or close to the poverty line, the government cannot deal with and resolve the problems of a 500,000-strong ethnic group with many problems in the short term. [passage omitted]

Therefore, this public foundation has two basic aims: to provide scholarships to talented gypsy children and to continue the village program of helping people who want to begin again. For example, local government would lend land free of charge to the local gypsy community. [passage omitted]

Hungary: UVM Wants Own Autonomous Region

LD0602215196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Association of Vojvodina Hungarians [UVM] wants to achieve full self-government, that is, territorial autonomy, for the southern region populated by Hungarians.

Outlining the three-stage autonomy concept of the organization, Chairman Jozsef Kasza said that first they want to achieve equal rights for the minorities, then they would create personal and finally territorial autonomy by setting up a Hungarian Autonomous Region.

Hungary: Vetting Law Amendment Presented to Assembly

LD0702113396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0930 GMT 7 Jan 96

[Amendment to the Law on Vetting Officials Filling Certain Important Posts, 1994, submitted by Interior Minister Gabor Kuncze to the Assembly—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Madame speaker, esteemed fellow deputies: [passage omitted]

As one of its latest laws in 1994, the previous parliament passed a law, the implementation of which has started and certain elements of which are currently being implemented. Several points of this law, however, have been deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court set 30 December 1995 as the deadline to eliminate this unconstitutional situation, to pass a new law. However, no appropriate proposal was submitted to parliament. On behalf of the government and myself, I regard this as unfortunate. [passage omitted]

By debating and passing a law now, our task is to settle a problem outstanding from the period of change in regime. [passage omitted] Let me mention a moral dilemma: this bill is about secret agents and, indeed, so far we have been unable to settle the problem of what to do with those who were forced to sign on as an agent or to perform this kind of activity. Let me stress, however, that there were people who were not forced to do so by blackmail. Now we have an opportunity finally to settle certain points of this issue, where possible. This is the intention behind the government proposal. [passage omitted]

I would like to focus on certain questions which will have to be regulated. One of these questions applies to determining who should be vetted. The current law rules that data on certain officials in state power or in public political life—listed in the law—who pursued unconstitutional activities or were members of organizations which pursued unconstitutional activities have to be made public, unless they resign from their given position or office. Criticizing the law in this respect, the Constitutional Court, however, ruled that the law's second paragraph, which lists the positions to which the law applies, does not consistently apply the same criteria in separating personal data and data of public interest. [passage omitted]

In this respect, the key question is that uniform constitutional criteria have to be applied. Therefore, the definition of this political sphere, this group of people, requires a political decision. The Constitutional Court does not rule that the sphere of those to be vetted has

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to be narrowed down, or widened. This is left to the legislators. It only rules that unified criteria should be applied.

From this it follows, in my view, that we have to submit a proposal on whether those to be vetted should be restricted to the sphere of the state executive power, and then we have to define the exact posts; or whether the sphere of those to be vetted should be widened and extended to public figures in social and political life, that is to say, extend it to a much wider sphere.

The bill submitted to you does not propose extending the scope of the law to the nonstate sphere. The main reason for this is that it is very difficult, or almost impossible, to apply unified constitutional criteria in this field. For these groups, persons whose political and public importance is similar have significantly different functions—for example, parties, trade unions, churches, interest-representation organizations of employers and professional groups. [passage omitted]

Remaining within the state sphere, we propose that only those who exercise executive power should come under the law, because this is the group of people who have the greatest influence on forming and operating the constitutional state. In pursuit of this, we propose, as a unified criteria, that the law should apply to those persons who are obliged to take an oath before the National Assembly or the president of the republic. By ruling this, we could set a constitutional criterion which is free of any kind of subjective element.

Esteemed fellow deputies, as I mentioned before, this sphere can be widened or narrowed. The main point is the application of unified criteria. This is one of the points of this proposal which is likely to provoke a sharp debate. [passage omitted]

The next issue I would like to raise is the nature of the data kept in files, from the public interest aspect. [passage omitted] From this perspective, it is not only—or not primarily—data on registered persons that can qualify as being of public interest, but also the information which can be accessed about the operation of the state organization in the recent past. The bill intends to serve openness by making scientific research into these documents possible, and data of public interest could become public through this channel, too. [passage omitted]

According to regulations on the protection of personal data, personal data can only be published or passed on to somebody else with the approval or authorization of the person concerned. The bill lays down the circumstances and conditions when data can be published or disclosed to someone else. In any other cases, unless the person concerned approves the publication, the protection of data must be guaranteed.

The next issue raised by the Constitutional Court was individuals' rights to decide how they use information about themselves. The Constitutional Court explained its decision in the following way: The meaning of individuals' right to decide how they use information about themselves laid down in Paragraph 59 of the Constitution is that everybody has the right to decide on the disclosure and use of information about him/herself; everybody has a constitutional right to gain access to and use information about him/herself. The current law did not rule on this, nor did it make it possible to exercise this right. The Constitutional Court ruled this situation unconstitutional.

The right of individuals to decide how they use information about themselves also includes the right to delete data. In several cases it would lead to the failure of investigation, since evidence on somebody's agent activity or the name of witnesses necessary to prove somebody's agent activity can be found in deleted data, or data to be deleted. In order to solve this problem, the bill lays down that the persons concerned can exercise the right to delete data only after the completion of the investigation ruled by this bill—that is, to say, after 30 June 2000. This, however, does not apply to their right to gain access to this data.

According to the Constitutional Court's ruling, the investigation cannot be restricted to data kept in the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry; it has to be extended to any other kind of data. In accordance with this, archives of the currently functioning national security services will also have to be involved in it. [passage omitted]

At the same time, those who carry out the investigation have to be given unlimited access to files and data only in the Interior Ministry and the History Office [Torteneti Hivatal] planned to be established by this law, while national security services would only be obliged to provide data at their request.

In addition to this, the bill extends the right of the investigating committee to require data from any records which can have information about activities falling under this law. The bill also rules that the personal identity data and addresses of witnesses and those under investigation can be retrieved from the citizens' personal data and address registrations.

I have mentioned that we are planning—proposing—to establish a History Office. The Interior Ministry's former III/III section [formerly responsible for dealing with domestic reactionary forces] has been wound

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up without a legal successor. The Interior Ministry keeps and looks after the documents of this department without using its data for any of its present lawful activities. At the same time, as is included in the Constitutional Court's ruling, documents and data on activities falling under this law can be found not only in these files and this data does not serve any lawful activity by these organizations, either. These files are kept not only at the Interior Ministry, but at the national security services, the Defense Ministry, and other organizations as well.

A large number of documents have been accumulated in the Interior Ministry, which has hardly handed over documents to archives over the past 40 some years. The handling of these documents is not lawful anymore, but can be of lasting value. Therefore, the separation of available data has become necessary from several aspects.

By concentrating these documents in the History Office, we can make judicial investigations much easier. [passage omitted] The establishment of the History Office is also necessary because the Constitutional Court passed rulings about the exercising of individuals' right to decide how they use information about themselves, and this can best be ensured if these documents are kept in one place. [passage omitted]

Finally, I think, a separate archive for these documents is also important, because by doing this we can prevent these documents from becoming the puppet of politics at some time in the future. [passage omitted]

According to our proposal, the History Office would have a separate entry in the budget, it would be an independent legal entity, its chairman and deputy chairman would be appointed by the president of the republic at the proposal of the prime minister, and would be answerable to the National Assembly and not to the government. In this sense it would be independent of the government. [passage omitted]

It is possible that, despite its best intention, parliament will pass a decision which will not be approved by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, I propose that when we come to a decision, we should turn to the Constitutional Court before the enactment of the law. If it is done by the parliament, there is no time limit for the Constitutional Court's examination. Therefore, I will propose—in the light of the clear content of the law after the debate and the final voting—that we should appeal to the president of the republic to ask for a Constitutional Court ruling on the law. In this event, the examination can be conducted out of schedule. [passage omitted]

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B-H: Croats Reject EU Administrator's Mostar Proposal

AU0602170596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Feb 96

[Report by Mirsad Behram from Mostar]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the session of the advisory council consisting of the representatives of the Bosniak and the Croat side, Serb delegates, and officials of the European Administration, EU Administrator Hans Koschnick once again tried to secure the support of both sides for his proposal of Mostar's political setup. The session of this council was held behind closed doors.

After several hours of negotiations, which mostly dwelled on the separation maps of the future six municipalities and the central municipal zone, the representatives of the Croat side, headed by [western Mostar] Mayor Mijo Brajkovic, were the first to leave the hall in which the talks were being held. Mr. Brajkovic later stated that there were still differing views, and if Hans Koschnick, as Brajkovic said, made the right decision, the Croat side would accept it.

The mayor of eastern Mostar, Safet Orucevic, informed correspondents that the Croat side had rejected Koschnick's proposal and the idea about the central municipal zone. Mr. Orucevic said that the Bosniak side accepted the administrator's arbitration in principle, emphasizing the importance of issues such as freedom of movement, joint police, and protection of private property. Orucevic said that the Croat side had rejected Koschnick's proposal, but that, with the help of the leaderships of the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic, local problems should be removed so as not to pose an obstacle to relations between the two countries that were agreed upon at the highest level.

B-H: Mostar's Croat Leader Rejects Koschnick Plan

AU0702123096 Paris AFP in English 1158 GMT 7 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 7 (AFP) — The Croat community on Wednesday [7 February] rejected a European Union offer to redraw the district map of the southern town of Mostar, fraught by severe tension between its divided Croat and Moslem population.

Croat Mayor Mijo Brajkovic announced the refusal shortly after EU administrator of Mostar Hans Koschnick, who runs the city, had told a press conference he was changing the map of administrative districts in a bid to prevent a new flare-up of fighting between the two communities.

B-H: Mostar's Brajkovic Breaks 'All Contacts' With EU

AU0702125596 Paris AFP in English 1227 GMT 7 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 7 (AFP) — The Croat community on Wednesday rejected a new European Union district map of the southern city of Mostar, fraught by severe tension between its divided Croat and Moslem population.

Croat Mayor Mijo Brajkovic announced the refusal shortly after EU administrator of Mostar Hans Koschnick, who runs the city, had told a press conference he was changing the map of administrative districts in a bid to prevent a new flare-up of fighting between the two communities.

Koschnick said the new map also aimed at avoiding splitting the historic city in two.

But the mayor announced that he was breaking off all contacts with the EU administration in Mostar. Brajkovic particularly objected to EU plans for a common district for both the Moslem and the Croat communities, saying: "We consider the existence of a common district contrary to the Dayton Peace Agreement which foresaw only three Croat and three Moslem districts."

The new proposed EU map would divide the town into three Moslem districts, three Croat districts and one district common to both. The new arrangements aim at abolishing a demarcation line Thursday and resuming free movement throughout the town. [passage omitted]

B-H: Croats Suspend Links With EU Mostar Administrator

LD0702130196 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 7 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At a news conference today, Hans Koschnick, the EU administrator for Mostar, announced his decision on the administration of Mostar. HINA journalist Pero Gasparevic reports. [passage omitted]

After Koschnick's decision was announced, the [Bosnian Croat] municipal council of Mostar issued a statement that was read out to the journalists by the council's chairman, Mijo Brajkovic.

The municipal council of Mostar, supported by the political authorities, the associations of the victims of the homeland war, and all the citizens of Mostar,

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announces the suspension of all contacts with the EU in Mostar, the statement says.

It points out that Hans Koschnick, in flagrant violation of the Dayton agreement, created the seventh municipality in Mostar, that is, the fourth Muslim municipality with the majority Muslim population. Giving in to the pressures of the part of the world which, in an unnatural and flawed way and against the will of an entire people, wants to solve the situation in Mostar in the pursuit of its own interests, Administrator Koschnick gave in to the pressures of the Muslim side, which was dissatisfied with the Dayton agreement. By ignoring the realistic and well-founded proposals of the Croatian side, the statement says, and by creating the central district, Koschnick and the European Union have totally sided with only one side. The municipality council of Mostar holds that with this action, the mission of the European administration in Mostar definitely ends. By his decision, Administrator Koschnick has split the city into two, said the statement, which was read out to journalists by Mijo Brajkovic, mayor of western Mostar.

B-H: Croat Protestors Ransack Koschnick's Offices

AU0702125796 Paris AFP in English 1241 GMT 7 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 7 (AFP) — Dozens of Croat demonstrators ransacked EU offices in Mostar Wednesday [7 February] after the city's EU administrator announced new administrative boundaries for the divided southern city.

Protestors forced their way into the hotel where the EU administrator Hans Koschnick has his headquarters and began to wreck the offices, European police at the scene said.

B-H: PM Muratovic on Arms, Mostar, NATO Effort

MM0702122696 London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 7 Feb 96 pp 1, 6

[Report by As'ad Taha in Sarajevo: "Bosnian Premier Tells AL-HAYAH: No Secret Agreement To Provide Our Army With Weapons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement to AL-HAYAH from his Sarajevo office, Bosnian Premier Hasan Muratovic denied yesterday that there is a secret agreement to provide the Bosnian Army with weapons. He said that "the Dayton peace agreement openly mentions providing our army and the Bosnian Croat militias with weapons in order to establish a balance between the Bosnian areas under control of the Serbs, and those belonging to the (Bosnian-Croat) federal union."

The Bosnian prime minister stressed that "further details of the armament deal will be made public and will not be kept secret." He added that the Dayton talks did not include purported Saudi financing to provide weapons to the Bosnian Army. He has agreed, however, to the United States and Turkey performing this task, until sources of finance are found.

Muratovic said that his government s top priorities are reconstruction, repairing the country's economic infrastructure, and implementing the terms of the peace agreement, especially with regard to holding elections and solving the social problems resulting from the war.

The Bosnian prime minister described the conditions in Mostar as "difficult" in view of the "tensions" between Muslims and Croats. He said that this concerns the issue of the war criminals whom the Croats are refusing to hand over to the International Court of Justice, especially as they are still holding sensitive posts, and support the hard-line Croatian position rejecting the search for a final solution. He expects, however, that the Croats will respond to the European initiative to partition Mostar.

Muratovic praised the NATO forces' efforts in implementing the military side of the peace agreement. He pointed out, however, that these forces "could have contributed more toward solving the civilian problems, especially with regard to citizens' freedom of movement." He expressed his belief that the 12-month period allocated by the Dayton agreement for the NATO forces deployment will suffice to implement the agreement, but that some forces may have to remain in some areas.

Muratovic denied that any divisions occurred among the Muslims after the departure of former Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic from the government. He said that there are some political disagreements and divergence of views on some issues, but "this does not mean, however, a rift or the presence of two currents within Bosnian society."

The prime minister did not rule out that there may be changes in the Bosnian party map in preparation for the upcoming elections.

He stressed that all the mujahidin have actually left Bosnian territory "with the exception of a group of no more than 50, who got married there, obtained Bosnian nationality, and now live like any ordinary Bosnia-Herzegovina citizen."

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B-H: PM Muratovic Views Return of Refugees, Aid

AU0602141796 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 6 Feb 96 p 3

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic by Erich Rathfelder; place and date not given: "Carl Bildt Is Violating the Dayton Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Rathfelder] Prime Minister, your predecessor, Haris Silajdzic, gained international respect. Will you continue his policy or set different political accents?

[Muratovic] Haris Silajdzic and myself are the only ones who have been part of all six governments since Bosnia-Herzegovina reached independence. I stand for continuity of the current policy.

[Rathfelder] You have run into major trouble right after you took office. The Serbian population of Sarajevo, which will be completely under your control under the Dayton agreement, is threatening to leave. Most of them have already left.

[Muratovic] We cannot do more than ask the Serbian population to stay. They will be able to live as citizens with equal rights in the Bosnian-Croatian Federation, and all their rights will be respected. However, there will not be any special rights. We also have to take into consideration the rights of those Bosnians and Bosnian Croats who were expelled from this region, and who now want to return starting on day D-45, that is to say 45 days after the coming into force of the Dayton Agreement.

[Rathfelder] The "high representative" for civilian reconstruction, Carl Bildt, wants to keep the Serbian police in the Serbian neighborhoods of Sarajevo beyond D-45. You have strongly protested against that and spoken of a breach of the Dayton accord.

[Muratovic] It is a breach of the Dayton accord. The peace agreement clearly states that delays in the agreed withdrawal plan can be justified only with technical problems.

[Rathfelder] What has U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said about the dispute?

[Muratovic] Sources of the U.S. delegation stated that the agreement must be implemented.

[Rathfelder] What do you want to do now?

[Muratovic] We will give Mr. Bildt seven days to revise his decision. With his deputy, Michael Steiner, cooperation has so far been good.

[Rathfelder] It looks as if in the military sphere, that is to say the area within the responsibility of the Implementation Force [IFOR], the Dayton agreement is being implemented.

[Muratovic] That's right. There is nothing we could criticize about that; coordination within IFOR is working, there is a clear command structure. It is again the United Nations that is lagging behind; it should have sent police forces a long time ago, then all the trouble here in Sarajevo would have been avoided.

[Rathfelder] Another major problem you are facing is the return of the refugees. The German Government has now decided to send refugees back starting on 1 June; Switzerland and Austria are also seeking a solution.

[Muratovic] Our refugees minister is currently visiting Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. We will set up a joint coordination office in Bonn that will organize the details of the return.

[Rathfelder] Do you have an idea of where the refugees can return to? Many fear for their safety if they return to the villages from which they were expelled.

[Muratovic] Basically, we want all refugees to be able to return. Nevertheless, repatriation can start only once we have created room for them. They must have a place to stay and find work. We want to set priorities: First those should come who can return to their home villages. This applies so far only to those who originate from the Bosnian-Croatian Federation. Second, we want to have experts and qualified people back whom we need even if they cannot return to their home towns. Third, we want to create settlements for those who want to return to the country but not to their original places of living. We are, of course, hoping that the international community and IFOR will generally enforce the right to return, although, realistically, I do not believe that this will happen soon.

[Rathfelder] The right to return was laid down in Dayton....

[Muratovic] There is even a clear definition for it. Yet, there is no instrument with which it could be enforced. That is why I am not exactly optimistic.

[Rathfelder] Are you saying that also because you did not even manage to achieve any progress in the Bosnian-Croatian Federation?

[Muratovic] On 9 November we signed another agreement on the Federation in Dayton. Yet, it is true that we have not yet made much progress. We will see whether progress can be achieved in the area of border checks and customs. In Mostar on Friday we accepted the proposal of EU Administrator Hans Koschnick to set up six

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districts, even though that is not quite what we want. Still, the real problem in Mostar is the existence of a Mafia, and the power of war criminals who are not being extradited to the Hague Tribunal.

[Rathfelder] How can your government support the investigators in The Hague, for example in the examination of the mass graves?

[Muratovic] The women of Srebrenica are calling for the unconditional clarification of the fate of their family members. They have formulated two demands: They want to visit the mass graves, and they want to start identifying the dead bodies. They want to know whether there are still any survivors. They hope that not everybody has been killed yet. We are also thinking that hundreds, if not thousands, are still alive, being forced to slave in some place. We have asked the Red Cross and IFOR to start investigations and to free the people who are still detained.

[Rathfelder] Your government initially made the clarification of the fate of the missing people of Srebrenica a condition for the exchange of prisoners, but finally gave in. Why?

[Muratovic] We were under enormous pressure from the international community, as the Dayton agreement provides for the unconditional exchange of prisoners. Therefore, we adhered to the agreement, while Carl Bildt does not.

Nevertheless, we are hoping to receive international aid soon in the area of the economy and democratization. To restimulate the economy measures must now finally be taken to invest into projects the funds that have been granted. Only with the stimulation of the economy, with democratization in all parts of the country, and free, independent media is development of society conceivable that can make the reintegration of the refugees possible.

B-H: Intelligence Official on Arrest of Serb Officers

AU0602154696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Feb 96

[Report by Samir Huseinovic on a news conference by Bakir Alispahic, director of the Agency for Investigation and Documentation, the Bosnian intelligence service, in Sarajevo on 6 February — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Huseinovic] At a very well-attended news conference, which confirmed both the local and international interest in this case, Bakir Alispahic, director of the Agency for Investigation and Documentation, made a brief statement:

[Alispahic] Based on the information that a high-ranking officer of the Serb army was on our territory, one whose participation in and aiding war crimes against civilians is documented, an intensified traffic inspection led to the arrest of General Djordje Djukic, Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, and their driver Radenko Todorovic.

Since there is founded suspicion that these two officers were implicated in war crimes against civilians, an investigation was launched in accordance with our responsibilities and authority. The representatives of the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, who work on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have joined the investigating process. Therefore, the judicial investigating bodies will have the final say in the cases of the Serb army's general and colonel, while the driver will be released following the closing of the investigation.

As for [word indistinct] Tesic, Petar Todorovic, Dusan Borovic, who are soldiers in the Serb army, they were arrested because a routine traffic check revealed that they were in possession of rifles, hand grenades, and a considerable amount of ammunition, which was reason enough for their detention. During full identification, there was reasonable suspicion that these men had committed acts of murder against civilians on the territory of Vlasenica, Bijeljina, Zvornik, Visegrad, and Foca. The judicial bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the representatives of the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague will have the final say as to the fate of this group of men.

[Huseinovic] One of the reporters' asked what evidence was used to detain the suspects.

[Alispahic] We would not have detained these people if we had had no evidence, and we would not have involved The Hague investigators. There is evidence, documentation that directly involves them in war crimes committed against civilians even on the territory of Sarajevo. In the interest of the investigation I have no right to reveal details.

[Huseinovic] Asked whether the officers would be released if The Hague fails to indict them, Alispahic said:

[Alispahic] The fate of these people is in the hands of the investigating bodies of the Bosnia-Herzegovina judiciary and The Hague court investigators. They will have the final say and we will respect their decision.

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B-H: Serbs Demand Release of Arrested 'Negotiators'

AU0602170096 Paris AFP in English 1556 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 6 (AFP) — The Bosnian Serbs are suspending all contact with the mainly-Moslem Bosnian government because their negotiators had been arrested, Serb radio said Tuesday.

The move comes hard on the heels of the arrests by Bosnian police of eight Serb soldiers — including a general and a colonel — on suspicion of war crimes.

"The Serb side has decided to postpone all contacts with the (Moslem-Croat) federation until 11 Serbs arrested illegally are released," the radio said.

"Serb representatives will not attend negotiations in Moslem-held Sarajevo because they do not have guarantees for their safety," it added.

The radio said Bosnia's Serbs were now demanding future negotiations are held in "a building between the two entities' territories."

Under the U.S.-brokered Dayton peace accords for Bosnia the country is split between a Croat-Moslem federation and a Serb republic, with a weak central government for the overall Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Bosnian government have only spoken of eight detainees, the men having been arrested in three separate incidents in government controlled territory between January 20 and February 2.

B-H: Serbs 'Suspend All Contacts' With Federation

LD0602171796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1636 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 6 Feb (SRNA) — The government of the Serb Republic today reached a decision to suspend all contacts with representatives of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and banned until further notice all Serb representatives from visiting the Muslim part of Sarajevo.

Despite warnings by Serb Republic representatives that incorrect and inconsistent behavior of the Muslim authorities could threaten the implementation of the peace agreement in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, neither Implementation Force [IFOR] representatives nor the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina have reacted with promptness.

"Unfortunately, the town of Sarajevo has therefore become a European Beirut! The war is over, there are no more hostilities and nobody should violate the Dayton agreement; however, the Muslim authorities have arrested their former adversaries, although the agreement sets out that all persons caught on another side's territory should only be returned, not arrested," stresses a communique from today's session of the Serb Republic government, which goes on to say:

"The most drastic example of the violation of the peace agreement is the arrest of 11 Serbs, including Lieutenant Colonel General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic and his driver, who were on their way to talks with IFOR representatives in Ilidza. By adopting the Beirut model of conduct, Sarajevo has disqualified itself as a possible joint capital of the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

That is why the Serb side has decided to suspend all contacts with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation until the release of all 11 illegally detained Serbs. The Serb representatives are to stop going to the Muslim part of Sarajevo for negotiations because the safety of Serb representatives and journalists is not being guaranteed.

"In order to continue with the implementation of the peace agreement, it is necessary to find an extraterritorial area, a building straddling the border between the two entities, which could serve as a site for future meetings, provided one half of the building is secured by the Serb side," the Serb Republic goverment's statement said.

The Serb side firmly demands that the international community warn the Muslim side concerning its hostile behavior; at the same time it informs the public that it will not undertake any reciprocal measures in detaining Muslims, in order to facilitate the possibility of correcting the errors committed.

"The Serb [Republic] government is expecting urgent reactions from the IFOR representatives who hold, in accordance with their mission, the mediator role in resolving such incidents," the statement concludes.

B-H: Government Refuses ICRC Access to Captured Serbs

AU0602173596 Paris AFP in English 1711 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 6 (AFP)—The Bosnian government Tuesday freed five Serb prisoners in Gorazde but refused to let the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] visit eight Serb soldiers imprisoned in Sarajevo, the ICRC said.

The five Serbs in government detention in Gorazde in eastern Bosnia were handed over to the Serb side in Kopaci, on the border between government- and Serb-held land.

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The five were to have been released two weeks ago when all sides freed prisoners under the Dayton peace accord. But neither the ICRC nor the Bosnian side could say why this particular release was postponed for so long.

The ICRC also said it did not get the green light to visit eight Bosnian Serb soldiers arrested by Bosnian police over the past two weeks in the Sarajevo area.

The eight, including a Serb general and a colonel, were arrested on war crimes charges.

Bosnian State Security Chief Bakir Alispahic said Tuesday that three of the eight will be released soon.

B-H: Muslims Free 5 Bosnian Serb POW's; 88 Remain

LD0602225896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2248 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 6 (TANJUG) — Bosnian Muslims on Tuesday released five Bosnian Serb prisoners of war but held another 88 registered prisoners in violation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said.

Bosnian Muslim Leader Alija Izetbegovic had promised visiting U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher on Saturday that five Serbs held in the eastern Bosnian town of Gorazde would be freed that day.

An ICRC spokeswoman in Sarajevo said that the Muslim Government still held 88 Serb pows in Tuzla but was unable to say precisely when they will be released, the REUTER news agency said.

A Bosnian Muslim army spokesman in Tuzla said earlier in the day that the 88 Serb prisoners would be released 'in the next few days.'

Under the Dayton Agreement, all registered prisoners of war free of war crime charges were to be released by Jan. 19 at the latest.

B-H: Serb Commander on 'Illegal' Arrest of Officers

LD0602212096 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Here is what Colonel General Dragomir Milosevic, commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the Serb Republic Army, said in connection with the illegal arrest of Serb officers and soldiers in Sarajevo:

[Begin Milosevic recording] Here we have a situation where so far ten people have been arrested in the Muslim part of Sarajevo. These are people who were only performing their regular duties and tasks at the moment when they found themselves in that IFOR [Implementation Force]-controlled zone, in that buffer zone, when they were arrested.

In concrete terms, here is a list of people who I know have been arrested: Teso Tesic, Dusan Borovic, Pero Todorovic, Zoran Spasovic, Branimir Lalic. Then the latest case of capture, General Djukic — you know the situation surrounding his arrest — who was going to a meeting with IFOR in Ilidza. Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic and driver Radenko Todorovic were accompanying him. Then we have Milan Boganovic, who was arrested prior to this incident, Mile Dojenovic, and Luka Skobo.

You can see for yourselves that Muslim prisons are now teeming with more Serbs than during the war. If such practice continues, and their attitude remains the same, then it will be clear that the Serbs do not enjoy any sort of safety in the areas where they should live and where they can live, where they can move. This shows that the rules on the movement of the Serb people are not the same as rules for their people, the Muslim people, and their army.

These are newly created problems and phenomena that have complicated the situation extremely, and have led to the point where such an attitude and state of affairs cannot be tolerated, nor can we accept double standards and completely contradictory views when it comes to the arrest of the Serb people, compared with reactions and demands by IFOR toward cases when persons of Muslim nationality are caught on our territory performing illegal activities. [end recording]

B-H: Kasagic Refuses To Meet Bildt, Prince Charles

LD0702140696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1303 GMT 7 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 7 Feb (SRNA) — In line with yesterday's decision by the Government of the Serb Republic to postpone all contacts with representatives of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to ban visits by Serb representatives to the Muslim part of Sarajevo, the Ministry of Information of the Serb Republic has issued a statement on the cancellation of Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic's meetings with High Representative Carl Bildt and with Prince Charles in Sarajevo tomorrow.

The statement says that the meeting between the demarcation commissions, scheduled for 8 February in Ilidza, has also been postponed as well as the first meeting between representatives of the journalist associations of the Serb Republic and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, scheduled for 9 February in Pale.

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B-H: Red Cross Believes 3,000 Srebrenica Muslims Killed

AU0702123896 Paris AFP in English 1205 GMT 7 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Geneva, Feb 7 (AFP) — At least 3,000 Bosnian Moslems were killed when Serb forces overran the Srebrenica enclave in eastern Bosnia last July, a Red Cross official said here Wednesday.

"I am convinced that these people are not alive," Jean de Courten, head of operations at the International Committee of the Red Cross, told a press conference on his return from a mission to Bosnia. "They (the killings) were carried out by armed groups and police forces," he said.

De Courten said an estimated 5,000 others were still missing from Srebrenica, and it was not known whether they were still alive. [passage omitted]

Up to 8,000 Moslems, mainly men of draft age, have remained unaccounted for since the then so-called UN safe haven was captured. The men were separated from their womenfolk under the noses of UN peacekeepers, tarnishing further the UN force's already battered image.

De Courten said he based his estimates of the death toll on numerous interviews conducted by the ICRC with people who managed to flee the enclave. The agency put together a list of some 3,000 names using their statements and consultations with other aid organisations and Moslem and Serb officials. [passage omitted]

B-H: Evidence Points to More Mass Graves in Srebrenica

AU0502082196 Paris AFP in English 0215 GMT 5 Feb 96

[By Jean-Luc Porte]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kasaba, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Feb 5 (AFP) — Evidence is emerging of more mass graves at hitherto unreported sites just outside the martyred enclave of Srebrenica, which according to witnesses contain the bodies of Moslems who fled after the area fell to the Serbs in July.

Senija was one of several witnesses interviewed by AFP whose accounts pointed to the existence of several mass graves near Kasaba, a village about 30 kilometres (20 miles) west of Srebrenica and which lies a short distance outside the former UN-designated "safe area".

Senija fled the enclave on July in a bus the day after it was captured by Serb forces. She still remembers going through Kasaba: "As we went into the village, about 1,000 to 1,500 men were sat on the sports ground guarded by the Chetniks (a pejorative term for the Serbs) who mocked us by waving us goodbye."

"Our men were sitting on the grass with their heads hanging," she said.

Today the three concrete buildings in front of the sports ground are riddled with bullet holes and the walls of one room in the building probably used as a dressing room, are scarred with the marks of hundreds of impacts from light arms.

To the left near the river, piles of charred clothing and shoes are still visible. Jackets with traces of bullet holes in the back have also been found, along with a photograph of a Moslem peasant woman in traditional dress beside her daughter.

Other accounts given to AFP by Moslem soldiers who fled the enclave, confirmed that on July 12 in the early evening, about 5,000 men from a column of 12,000 soldiers, became trapped in the forest of Kamenica about four kilometres (2.5 miles) east of Kasaba.

They were unable to advance because of heavy shelling by Serb forces who had localised the retreating Moslems.

"More than 5,000 men were cut off in Kamenica forest while the 7,000 in front managed to get through Serb lines because the Serbs were not yet sufficiently organised and were initially unnerved by our numbers," said Hasan who now lives in Sarajevo.

"Several groups, each of about 100 men, then dispersed and a great many were captured by the heavily-armed Serbs who were waiting to ambush them in trenches they had dug along the side of the road," he went on.

The trenches and cartridges are still there along the road between Kasaba and Konjevic Polje three kilometres (two miles) to the north — mute witnesses to the trap which awaited the fleeing Moslem soldiers.

"After being taken prisoner, our soldiers, if they were not killed on the spot, were taken to Kamenica stadium or to the school at Konjevic Polje," said Hasan who said he escaped by throwing himself into a river.

Radovan, a Serb policeman from Milici in the northeast was sent with reinforcements to this road on July 12. He recounted: "We had taken Moslem prisoners, exhausted and starving men, and taken them to our superior at Kasaba. He angrily told us: 'Why did you bring them here. What am I supposed to do with them. Kill them'."

"I myself did nothing," he added.

Dragan, a young man who deserted from the Bosnian Serb army, speaks about his brief passage in October at

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Tekija about two kilometres (one miles) north of Kasaba where his unit was sent to harvest maize.

"In the big field just right of the bridge, right in the middle of the maize stalks, we found a patch of newly turned soil about 50 metres by 10 metres (yards) and a bulldozer beside it. We were astonished and we questioned the sergeant who said briefly 'That's where we buried the wogs'."

An AFP correspondent visited the area and found a large mound of recently turned earth in the middle of a maize field and also traces left by a bulldozer.

The site of about 15 mass graves has already been determined with virtual certainty by juxtaposing witness accounts and press reports.

However some human rights groups believe there could be up to 200 mass graves scattered round the country containing the bodies of thousands of Moslems.

These sites are mainly located in two regions still under Serb control: Srebrenica in the east and Banja Luka in the northwest.

The UN Rapporter on Human Rights in ex-Yugoslavia Elizabeth Rehn visited one of the sites on Sunday.

For the whole of Bosnia, the Moslem-led government has cited a figure of 24,000 missing persons, most of whom were victims of the "ethnic cleansing" carried out from 1992 to 1995 by Serb forces.

B-H: Koljevic, Serbs Doubt Hague Tribunal's Objectivity

LD0602140696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1339 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 6 Feb (SRNA) — Dr. Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic [RS], said today that the Serbs will have difficulty believing in the objectivity of the Hague Tribunal and that a distinction should be made between what exactly did happen during the war and the media propaganda.

After his meeting with Elizabeth Rehn, the UN secretary general's rapporteur for human rights, Koljevic emphasized the need for objectivity and warned that the accusations against Serb politicians create an impression that the other side was innocent.

The RS vice president drew attention to the sufferings of the thousands of Serbs in the Muslim part of Sarajevo, held there as ethnic hostages, and to the sufferings of the Serb population in Tuzla and Zenica.

He said that he trusts Mrs. Rehn and believes in her objectivity, and stated he hopes that all three sides will cooperate with her over the issue of human rights. He said that the Hague Tribunal's "reputation" has nothing to do with her objective work.

Elizabeth Rehn said that she has been asked by the UN Security Council to visit Srebrenica to check some statements and that the Serb side has made it possible for her to tour the area.

"I feel that I can continue my work here and that I am welcome," she said after her talks with Koljevic in Pale.

B-H: Krajisnik Suggests Hague Tribunal 'Politicized'

AU0602150196 Paris AFP in English 1440 GMT 6 Feb 96

[By Michael Adler]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 6 (AFP) — A senior Bosnian Serb official warned UN human rights rapporteur Elisabeth Rehn Tuesday against politicization and propaganda in the international investigation of Bosnian war crimes.

But Rehn disagreed and praised the International Tribunal sitting in The Hague for its fairness in investigating war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.

In a meeting with Rehn at the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale, 15 kilometres (nine miles) east of Sarajevo, parliament speaker Momcilo Krajisnik said charges of ethnic cleansing and massacres were slanted unfairly against Serbs.

"It is difficult for Serbs and, I think, for many people in the outside world to believe that the crimes tribunal is not politicized," Krajisnik said.

Krajisnik repeated Serb charges that Serbs were "definitely ethnic hostages in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica and other Moslem-controlled towns." He said "more than 1,500 Serbs were killed as ethnic hostages in Sarajevo."

He also said charges of massacres during the war from April 1992 to December 1995 should be shared out on both sides since "If the leaders on one side are accused, it objectively means that one side did criminal deeds and the other side did not."

Krajisnik said one-sided charges were "not good for the reputation of that institution."

Rehn, who on Sunday toured the eastern Srebrenica region where thousands of Moslems may have been massacred, told reporters that she and Krajisnik had disagreed on several issues during their meeting, among them the Serb attack on the war crimes tribunal. "I

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have to admit we didn't agree on every point, also the question of why Srebrenica" is so important, Rehn said.

The international community has focused over the past month on moving the investigation of alleged mass graves and massacres in Bosnia forward. The two main Bosnian Serb leaders, their President Radovan Karadzic and military commander Ratko Mladic have been indicted as war criminals.

No senior Bonsian government official has been indicted by the International Tribunal in The Hague. Thomir Blaskic, commander of the Moslems' Croat allies in Bosnia, has, however, been indicted.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck visited the Srebrenica region last month and on Tuesday was to visit the Ljubija mine in northwestern Bosnia, where it is suspected there may be another mass grave.

Rehn on Sunday went to two spots in the town of Srebrenica where refugees had told her prisoners were being kept since the town was overrun by Serb forces last July.

She said after touring a department store basement and a school that she did not believe any prisoners were being held there, and on Monday she passed on this message to women refugees in Tuzla, northern Bosnia who had given her the reports.

Rehn also Sunday climbed a hill riddled with mines to a site where five bodies, now skeletons, from the rout of Srebrenica were lying, their identity cards on the ground beside them.

She said her goal was to have as many such sites investigated as possible, as well as mass graves, so that the names of the dead could be taken off the list of missing persons.

The Serb chief for the Srebrenica region during the war Miroslav Deronic told her Sunday that the thousands of Moslems missing there from the Bosnian war were dead but he said this was in battles and not massacres.

Western governments and agencies have estimated the number of missing from the Moslem enclave of Srebrenica, routed by Serb forces last July 12 and 13, at between 3,000 and 8,000. Rehn said she thought the number was closer to the former.

B-H: Serb Prime Minister Criticizes IFOR's Behavior

AU0602194596 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 96 p 5

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by M. Kusmuk; place and date not given: "They Are Destroying the State Via Municipalities!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Not a single point of the Dayton agreement can be changed, and thus the status of Serb Sarajevo cannot be changed either. The citizens must decide themselves whether they want to live in the federation or whether they want to move out.

This was stated for VESTI by Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the Serb Republic [RS], unequivocally denying all the announcements and hopes that a different solution for the capital city is possible.

In contrast to others in the state leadership, the RS prime minister does not have a particularly good opinion of IFOR's [Implementation Force] behavior.

"They have recently tried to avoid contacts with the members of the RS government," Kasagic says. "In the implementation of the peace agreement, they are trying to resolve all issues at the municipal level and are obviously trying to downgrade the state, the RS. Municipal leaders are obviously not aware of that, as their aim is to be the focus of attention for at least a day."

Municipal "Autonomists"

The prime minister is criticizing IFOR for having enabled the Muslim religious leader Reis ul-Ulema Mustafa Ceric to travel to Banja Luka but not being able to guarantee safety to Bishop Vasilije, who wanted to visit Tuzla and the eparchy in which he had served officially for 20 years. A similar thing happened at the meetings on the territory of the federation when the Serb journalists were told that if they wanted to be there, it would be at their own risk. Kasagic said that IFOR did not even guarantee safety to the RS authorities.

The prime minister obviously has serious objections regarding the work of some representatives of local authorities. Asked about the implementation of the Dayton agreement in the RS, he said that the republic has confirmed its identity with the agreement, and added:

"Not everything is finished with this. The outside pressure is enormous. It is also sufficiently destructive inside the country to return to the old. The government is trying to bolster and develop everything that has been achieved and made official in Dayton. It is trying to bring within the framework of its jurisdiction all those forces that are acting on their own accord in the municipalities, as well as to organize negotiations with the representatives of other countries and international institutions."

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Kasagic's cabinet and the prime minister himself have done much to establish contacts with politicians and businessmen from the Republic of Croatia. Many opposition parties take the view that they are rushing too much with that.

"As the head of the government, I said that I would initiate economic cooperation with all sides from the former Yugoslavia," Kasagic said. "The economy in this region used to develop in a complementary fashion, and economic cooperation can be restored. Interest in establishing economic links is more expressed in the RS than on the other side, as it has been in isolation for over a year and a half, which is equal to disaster."

Trains Are Heading Westward

According to Kasagic, the western part of the RS used to be linked economically more to the western part of the former Yugoslavia and Europe. The Banja Luka "Jelsingrad," Kasagic said, used to sell more machines to Slovenia than to anyone else. Krajina is a major exporter of wood to Italy. The oil pipe for the [Bosanski] Brod refinery is running through the Republic of Croatia. Rail transportation is significantly cheaper. There are no such links with Serbia, except the Bijeljina-Zvornik railroad, Kasagic says.

The prime minister has been criticized for having once again formed a government consisting of members of only one party, the Serbian Democratic Party.

"The Serbian Democratic Party is the ruling party in the RS. Any government that is elected while this party is in power would have to implement its program," Kasagic says. "The results achieved under the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party are undeniable. Preserving these achievements will be a task of those who assume power after the elections."

[Box, p 5]

Ministry of Internal Affairs Has Relieved 957 People of Duty

"We are certainly facing the reorganization of our internal affairs. So far, 957 employees have been relieved from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Staff changes are also taking place at other levels. Finding premises for the staff is also a problem. So is the rebuilding of the economic system," the prime minister said, answering the question on the government's priorities.

The prime minister said that the government is also working on establishing contacts with the governments and embassies of other countries. Its priority is to renew economic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

"All this is too big a burden for a small nation. The sanctions are a burden and a nightmare for the RS. It used to be much easier for us when our workers abroad partly shared our burden and sacrifices made to create the RS by paying their tax obligations here," Kasagic said.

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Croatia: Talks With Slovene Delegates Concluded

LD0602180196 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Talks between foreign affairs committees of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia have just concluded in Ljubljana. Jasminka Domaz reporting:

[Domaz] Zarko Domljan, chairman of the Croatian Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee, told us that their talks focused on issues such as Ljubljanska Bank, Krsko Nuclear Power Plant, Sveta Gera, and others. It was said that the Slovene side's position that the above-mentioned and other issues should be discussed in a package was unacceptable, because at a certain stage it could become tantamount to blackmail or (?linking) the resolution of one issue with the resolution of others. In other words, this could again lead to a deadlock in negotiations between the Croatian and Slovene sides.

The issue of succession in the wake of Yugoslavia's disintegration was also discussed. The two sides also spoke about the Italian minority in Croatia and Slovenia, about which Italian minority representative to the Slovene parliament, Bartelli, also spoke.

Particular attention was paid to the coordination of joint participation in international organizations, from the Council of Europe to the European Union, Partnership for Peace organization and NATO.

The Croatian parliamentary delegation is to be received in Ljubljana today by Zoran Thaler, Slovene minister of foreign affairs.

Croatia: Official Interviewed on Search for Missing

AU0602132296 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 pp 4-5

[Interview with Major Ivan Grujic, chairman of the Committee for the Detained and Missing, by Marinko Bobanovic; place and date not given: "We Know That There Are 24 Missing Persons in Serbian Prisons"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Bobanovic] In Belgrade, on Thursday, 25 January, a meeting of the working groups of the committees of the Republic of Croatia and so-called Yugoslavia was held, in which the problem of the detained, missing, and forcefully abducted persons was discussed. What was the concrete subject of your meeting, and what were the results of those talks?

[Grujic] Based upon the agreement between Milan Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Dr. Mate Granic, Deputy Prime Minister of the Government and Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia, in Belgrade on 25 and 26 January a meeting was held of the working groups of the committees of the governments of the Republic of Croatia and so- called Yugoslavia for humanitarian questions and of the working group for the missing and the Committee for the detained and missing. When talking about that meeting, we should get back to the beginning of the relations that we started regarding this problem with so-called Yugoslavia as early as last year, when, after practically a year of any talks being blocked, the process began of discussing, at the level of working groups, the detained, the missing, and forcefully abducted persons. Three meetings have been held in which certain results have been achieved. We have come into possession of information on 106 persons, 24 of them alive, and 82 of which were identified to be from the region of Vukovar.

Meeting of Good Will, But No Results

[Bobanovic] Have the victims' families been informed of this?

[Grujic] Everything has been published. The teams offering psycho-social help, and the Croatian Red Cross and its search team have informed the families. In the same way, the families of the living that this Committee has been seeking have been informed. In those meetings, so-called Yugoslavia has taken it upon itself to enable the survivors to contact the International Red Cross Committee and to enable them to come to the Republic of Croatia. The fourth meeting was supposed to take place in Zagreb, and we have sent them an invitation. However, the working group from so-called Yugoslavia has not responded. So, another interruption of relations at the level of the working groups has occurred.

After the signing of the Dayton agreement, the agreement was signed between the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Dr. Granic and the Foreign Minister of so-called Yugoslavia, Milan Milutinovic, on the convention of a common committee, and the first such meeting of a common committee has taken place in Zagreb. That meeting has practically shown only their political will, but without concrete results.

The next meeting was to be held before the New Year in Belgrade, but it was postponed. Only later on, on the occasion of Minister Granic's visit to Belgrade was it agreed to resume the work at the level of chairmen of the committees and working groups respectively. Precisely on the basis of that agreement we were in Belgrade on 25 January.

The goal of our meeting was to continue with the activity of the common committees, because they yielded some results. Apart from that, the goal was also to adopt

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a common protocol that would bind both sides to a procedure, that is, to release all the detainees related to the armed conflicts on both sides. The third goal was to give all the information on the missing and the documentation on those killed. So, those are three features that were supposed to be included in the meeting. [passage omitted]

[Bobanovic] What else did you discuss in that meeting?

[Grujic] We also discussed the realization of the Dayton agreement, which refers to the problem of the detained and missing. A part of the obligations from the agreement involves, apart from so-called Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, also Bosnia-Herzegovina, so it is necessary that all sides offer their maximum assistance in the realization of the agreement referring to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the Dayton agreement, there is also Annex 1a, which refers to the release of all the detainees from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to that agreement, all the sides in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina were supposed to have released all the prisoners from their prisons by 19 January. The Croat side has completely fulfilled the signed obligations from that agreement that it has taken upon itself, while the Serb side has fulfilled only a part of the obligations and released only 10 persons from the list of those who were to be released. We insisted in Belgrade that the Serb side should fulfill all the obligations from the Annex and the Dayton agreement, and release all the persons on the list. Apart from that, we demanded that the persons who are registered with the International Red Cross Committee be put on the release list. However, they are not on the release list proposed by the Serb side. The whole process would be accelerated if that part of the agreement were realized.

Still Dissatisfied With What Has Been Achieved

[Bobanovic] What has nevertheless been done?

[Grujic] We cannot be completely satisfied with the volume of results we have achieved, although we have reached some solutions. In the process of the talks between the working groups in 1995, so-called Yugoslavia has come up with the information that 24 missing persons from 1991 are alive, and that the International Red Cross Committee would be able to get in touch with them, and that they will be enabled to come to the Republic of Croatia.

[Bobanovic] Where are those persons now?

[Grujic] On the territory of so-called Yugoslavia. That is all I can say. As the International Red Cross Committee had not found them, that is, it had found only one person, we have insisted that the process be completed with all of them. However, Belgrade sent us an answer referring to 12 persons, as well as information on their whereabouts. It was agreed that the International Red Cross Committee would visit them immediately and that, according to their wishes, they would immediately start the process of bringing them to the Republic of Croatia. I expect that the families of those 12 persons will receive a message one of these days.

[Bobanovic] What can you tell us about the case of another three persons, who were found later on?

[Grujic] Apart from the aforementioned, we have also solved three concrete cases of missing persons. We have received an answer that two more persons from the 1991 list are alive, and we have already informed their families about that. We have also been informed that the third person died last year, and we have also informed the family of this. We have demanded to be given an adequate death certificate.

The Detainees Also in Camps?

[Bobanovic] Do you have any information on the allegedly great number of detainees in camps and mines in the territory of Serbia, where they have been engaged in heavy physical labor?

[Grujic] We have certain information that our missing persons from 1991 are alive and were forcefully abducted. It is mostly known who took them away and we have given the documents confirming this to the representatives of so-called Yugoslavia. There are indications that there are a certain number of missing persons in the territory of so-called Yugoslavia, because there is a lot of talk about the camps in its territory. As long as things are not explained, I do not want to give any further details.

[Bobanovic] Do you know how many we are talking about?

[Grujic] We will see that on the signing of the protocol and after they present the persons under their authority.

[Bobanovic] Did you request at the meeting that the so-called Yugoslav authorities allow the International Red Cross Committee access to those camps?

[Grujic] That is our standing request, but it can always be outmaneuvered. That is, if the persons have been tried for some other crime, for example, those who in 1991 were tried for arms smuggling, or some other crime, they do not fall into the category visited by the International Red Cross Committee, although they have to do with armed conflicts. This was the very reason why we insisted on registering all such cases, so that

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we could talk about the process of releasing all those persons related to the armed conflicts. So, that is our request, which we have persistently tried to realize for the second successive year, and I hope we are close to the final solution. [passage omitted]

So-Called Yugoslavia Must Say Yes to Exhumation

[Bobanovic] What results do you expect now that access has been granted to the sites of mass execution in eastern Slavonia? For Dayton and the Basic agreement envisage protection and free access to those sites?

All the committees since 1991 have been collecting this information, so this Committee has also been doing so. So far, in the Banovina region we have carried out the exhumation of some 10 mass graves, after which we determined the fate of 76 missing persons, and identified up to 130 persons in those mass graves. It will be done in the same way, of course, in the presence of the international community in the region of eastern Slavonia. There is no longer any reason for so-called Yugoslavia not to give us this information. If they nevertheless refuse to do so, we will solve that on our own.

[Bobanovic] The victims have to be identified after the exhumation of the mass graves. What are you doing to make the identification as precise as possible?

[Grujic] In order to have a successful identification, it is necessary to obtain information about who could be found in those mass graves before exhumation. During the exhumation a forensic medicine expert gathers data on every body that is found. Afterward, the mortal remains are completely processed at the Forensic Medicine Institute, and the data, available to the Committee for Identification, are delivered to the forensic medicine department. Afterward, on the basis of the material we receive from the forensic medicine department, we establish the individual's identity. That is an extremely complex process in which the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the Croatian Red Cross Searching Service, the Committee for the Detained and Missing, which gathers additional data through its trustees, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Justice are involved. [passage omitted]

[Bobanovic] What was the reaction of the Serb side when they saw your documentation on the missing?

[Grujic] We have exceptionally precise data on every missing person, as well as systematized data on our meetings, on every word uttered or any agreement. According to that, we cannot be surprised, and therefore those meetings are exceptionally long and painstaking because we discuss individual cases. We are trying to present the things that are clear to us to the other side so that they can do everything in their power to give us a quality answer. Those talks are always associated with concrete names and events because that is the only way to start the investigation on a certain person or group.

[Bobanovic] Do you still receive requests about missing persons?

[Grujic] We constantly receive requests because there are new captures, although not since Operation Una. Sometimes we receive old requests. That is parts of the families of the missing have been displaced all over the world, so that we do not have them registered. We want to present hard evidence from which one can see that the missing person is in their authority.

It Is Most Difficult With the Missing From 1991

[Bobanovic] What about those missing from 1991? Is there a special file kept on them?

[Grujic] The missing from 1991 are a difficult problem. We have solved 1993, 1994, and 1995. All the seizures that occurred in that period, registered or confessed, we have solved and the people have been released, so that they spent a relatively short time in prison. We have also succeeded in liberating the so-called "Sombor Group" from 1991.

We spare no efforts in liberating the persons seized in 1991 and 1992. When we find that someone has met a different fate, we support this by documentary evidence so as to have as small a number of missing as possible. Apart from that, we are sparing no efforts to liberate all the detainees in Operations Flash, Storm, Mistral, and Una, to find out what has happened to those captured and to liberate them immediately. Those who are not registered, and who, to our knowledge, are imprisoned, we are trying to register, and involve into the process of liberation. In the recent actions we liberated three persons in the territory of Herzeg-Bosnia and two in Davor.

[Bobanovic] Do you have the same approach toward all missing persons?

[Grujic] To all, regardless of time and place of disappearance or their affiliation, the approach is same. We solve everything we can.

[Box, p 4]

Positive Shift of So-Called Yugoslavia

[Bobanovic] What can you say about the discharge of 10,200 prisoners in so-called Yugoslavia announced by President Milosevic of Serbia?

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[Grujic] We have not received such official information, and I know about it only from the press. Prior to that information, there was information some 70 persons being discharged and released from prisons and camps. Allegedly, it is about Crni Vrh, where 70 persons have been released, all of them Muslims. The fact that so many people have been released itself tells us that in so-called Yugoslavia, nevertheless, such a process has begun, and that this could be positive if it continues and if it is applied also to Croats who are in their custody.

[Box, p 5]

Using Lists to Liberate People

[Bobanovic] What is the Serbian side prepared to do right now?

[Grujic] We have requested that so-called Yugoslavia give us information about the identified persons who were killed in the region of eastern Slavonia, Banovina, and in other regions where the JNA [Yugoslav Peoples' Army] participated, because these data are in Belgrade. They have publicly said in the media that they have a list of 1,400 identified persons. We know with confidence that they have been making such identifications in the area of eastern Slavonia and Banovina, and that they have precise data. Apart from that, they also have a list of some 300 unidentified persons, which means that they have the basic parameters needed for their identification—the photo albums of these unidentified persons. We have requested that they give this information to us, so that we can establish how many of the missing persons are among those identified, because it does not mean that those persons are at the same time the ones that we are looking for. In some cases it is already known that they died, and their families know that. We expect them, first, to give us this information, and, second, to tell us about all the persons who find themselves in their prisons.

Croatia: New Transport Minister Appointed

LD0602134596 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with Article 98, paragraph four of the Constitution of Croatia, the president of the Republic of Croatia approved a decision to replace Ivica Mudrinic as minister of maritime affairs, transport and communications pending his new appointment. By the same decision Zeljko Luzavec is appointed the new minister for maritime affairs, transport and communications. Zeljko Luzavec is 49.

Croatia: Tudjman Commends Officers' Delegation

LD0602160796 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman today in the presidential palace received a delegation of the Colonel Damir Tomljenovic Gavran Guard Training Center from Sipurine, near Zadar. In the delegation, among others, were General Ante Gotovina, the commander of the Split area of responsibility, and Colonel Verner Ilic, commander of the training center. Mirjana Grahovac reports:

[Grahovac] Stressing that a three-month training in the guard center for special training of non-commanding officers at the platoon commander rank was successfully completed today, General Ante Gotovina said: This substantial and demanding training is aimed at creating a highly professional and authoritative non-commanding cadre who will be an example to their subordinates and main support to their superiors. Mr. President, on behalf of all the trainees and members of the guard center and on behalf of the Split area of responsibility, we wish to thank you for your attention.

President Tudjman congratulated the fifth generation of trainees on the successful end to their training, and said:

[Begin Tudjman recording] Mr. General, commanding and non-commanding officers, I would like to congratulate you on this final test, so to speak, this exercise, on something that our public has already noticed is [break in transmission]. Gentlemen, a military career in all countries, at all times, and in all states is of special importance. It is an embodiment of chivalry, it demands a high degree of training in handling weapons, a high degree of physical prowess, but first and foremost, Gentlemen, it requires a high level of national awareness, high morale. In our circumstances, these have been of crucial importance in creating a free and sovereign Croatian state. As far as I know, you all personally took part in the historic operations for the liberation of the Croatian regions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. So you already have your experience of war, from which we ourselves have learned our lesson. Had you not been so prepared, had you not had the awareness, we would not have been so successful and our losses would have been far higher.

Gentlemen, you belong to generations of the Croatian army whose successes will remain inscribed in gold in Croatian history, who restored to us our free, sovereign Croatian independent state, which we have not had since the ancient times of Kings Tomislav, Kresimir, and Zvonimir. The world admires you—the world admires us for our wise policies, for our army, and our military

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skills. It is up to you now to remain soldiers capable of fulfilling every task in the interests of the homeland. You are in the non-commanding officer training center, but I think it was Napoleon who said that every soldier, every non-commanding officer must carry a marshal's baton in his army bag [words indistinct] in fulfilling tasks set for him. I am convinced that you will continue to fulfill your duties to your own satisfaction and to the honor and pride of your free, democratic, independent Croatian state. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Croatia: Settlement of Refugees in Baranja Reported

AU0602212996 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Beli Manastir Municipality Secretariat for Town Planning and Housing, Utilities, and Property Relations, together with the municipal Red Cross and comissioner for refugees, is in charge of accommodating refugees and displaced persons from the occupied parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina. Accommodation for 5,000 more displaced persons will be provided in Baranja.

[Unidentified correspondent] The program for the settlement and housing of the displaced persons says literally: The accommodation of displaced persons in Baranja must be given full attention as one of the important conditions for the fulfillment of the main interests of the Serb people. Refugees and displaced persons have been arriving to the Municipality of Beli Manastir since 1991, and the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly has taken concrete measures, through the bodies in charge, aimed at securing accommodation for 5,000 more displaced persons.

In the registration of the housing facilities in Baranja in late 1995, the following was determined: It is possible to accommodate 1,200 persons in housing facilities that need to be remodelled; 2,200 persons can be accommodated in housing facilities that have extra living space; and 1,600 persons can be accommodated in the housing facilities that have been occupied illegally by local people.

Expert committees have put together a remodelling project, which will require 38.334 million dinars. The help of the international community and the FRY will be crucial in securing these funds. The displaced persons and refugees who wish to settle in Baranja should first register with the center in Batina, where they will be given refugee status and where they will be temporarily accommodated until their use of a certain housing unit will be approved and they receive the official papers stating that it is their property. After they are accommodated in the housing facility, each family will receive a one-time aid package of food, blankets, and clothes, and shoes if necessary, from the municipal Red Cross. The food aid will be sufficient to feed all the household members for the first 10 days.

The officials of the Secretariat for Town Planning and Housing, Utilities, and Property Relations told us that displaced persons who used to live in villages will be accommodated on the vacant farms, while professionals, necessary for revitalizaing the Baranja economy, will have priority in Beli Manastir and Darda, two major towns in Baranja.

The implementation of the program for the settlement and housing of displaced persons began on 15 January, and 1,000 persons have arrived in Baranja so far. Three hundred-twenty families have filed requests for accommodation; 90 of them—that is 270 persons—have been accommodated. The others are still with their relatives or friends.

The Municipal Secretariat will provide information on the settlement and housing of displaced persons in Baranja. The telephone number is 0251-771-102, extensions 49 and 52.

Croatia: Serbs Appoint New Commander for Baranja

AU0602211096 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the order of the commander of the Slavonia-Baranja Corps, Lieutenant Miodrag Jovanovic was appointed commander of the Baranja Division.

According to the announcement of the Slavonia-Baranja Corps command, Lt. Jovanovic was born in 1950 and has carried out the command duties of platoon commander and division commander.

Croatia: Two Serb Women Found Shot Dead in Krajina

LD0602142896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1346 GMT 6 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb. 6 (TANJUG)—Croatian police have said in a statement that bodies of two killed Serb women were found in their homes in Krajina on Jan. 28.

An investigation, carried out by the investigative judge from the town of Zadar, established that 58-year-old Marija Zutic was shot in her home in the village of

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Ljubovic near the town of Gracac, Croatian press said on Tuesday.

Milica Olujic, 85, was also shot in the village of Bilisani near the Krajina town of Obrovac.

The statement said that police had taken necessary measures to find the perpetrators of the crimes.

About 250,000 Serbs fled Serb Krajina following Croatia's aggression of August 1995. Most of the remaining few thousand Serbs were old and weak.

According to international observers' reports, Croatian troops maltreated the remaining Serbs and systematically looted and destroyed the abandoned homes and other property.

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FYROM: Gligorov Gives Address on Coalition Situation

AU0702085096 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1430 GMT 6 Feb 96

[Address by President Kiro Gligorov; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] I am addressing you today because of the recent internal events in the Alliance for Macedonia. In assessing that this is a very serious and sensitive question with domestic and foreign implications, I would like to point out several facts: The Alliance for Macedonia was established as an election coalition during the second parliamentary and presidential elections in 1994. It was formed as a result of the parties' joint activities in the first and second parliamentary elections. The idea was not only based on pragmatic goals with the aim to conquer the leadership, but it also called for gathering parties with similar determinations and identical political goals so as to intensify democracy and economic progress as well as Macedonia's international position. The PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] also joined the government formation as a coalition partner. These were the basic motives for my acceptance as the common presidential candidate of the parties composing the Alliance for Macedonia, with the hope that their majority in parliament and the coalition government would spur a process of efficient political action, continued democracy, and economic prosperity.

The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] understood this very well, and the election results are known. Unfortunately, in the last few months, a process to break up the Alliance for Macedonia emerged. In a short period of time, a number of defined principles were forgotten and personal intolerance became ardent. The general political climate not only has long-range consequences for the country but the entire world. Moreover, all this is taking place at a time when all of the Alliance's political goals have been accomplished—Macedonia has established itself internationally, including membership in international organizations, reforms are continuing, there is a increase in international capital, and a number of countries have helped to stabilize the economy.

Considering that I was the Alliance's common candidate, I feel personally responsible. I want to appeal to the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Alliance to try to find acceptable solutions and to prove that the Macedonian Government is functioning and that the Macedonian citizens voted for the Alliance for Macedonia, that it was not a pragmatic decision for an easy conquering of the leadership, but that it was a joint duty and obligation in realizing a common platform. Therefore, if one Alliance member is expelled, then there will be a new structure that does not express the identity and political platform of the Alliance. I do not believe it is too late to find a reasonable solution because issues must not be solved with radicalism that is founded on personal passions and decisions. I appeal to both parties to sit together and discuss all the problems in a sincere way in order to reexamine possibilities for maintaining the Alliance for Macedonia. Otherwise, if its time is over, then everyone must accept their responsibility for future events.

I hope that my address will be understood as my good will and concern for the future of the country, particularly because I feel personally responsible for what we jointly promised the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.

FYROM: Former Envoy to U.S. Views Foreign Policy

AU0702084696 Skopje FOKUS in Macedonian 2 Feb 96 pp 2-4, 12

[Interview with Vasil Tupurkovski, former special envoy to the United States, by Nikola Mladenov; place and date not given: "Minister Frckovski Makes Accusations Without Arguments"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Mladenov] If you had remained in the United States, what could Macedonian foreign policy have expected?

[Tupurkovski] I firmly believed that we were making a terrible mistake not to raise the question of our admission to the United Nations in a formal and legal way, by submitting a formal request in the period between January 1992, when the European Union decided that we had to be recognized, and July 1992, when the EU decided to back up the Greek positions. In this vacuum of six months neither France nor England, as members of the UN Security Council, had the obligation to advocate a uniform European policy in the United Nations, because it [uniform policy] simply did not exist. This is why I believe that in this period there had been real chances for us to be accepted by the world organization under our constitutional name. At that time, none of the European member countries of the United Nations was obliged to adapt its foreign political activities to a general European policy, which was defined only in July 1992. [passage omitted]

[Mladenov] At that time, the opposition insisted that recognition did not come about because the authority did not want it....

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[Tupurkovski] I do not think so.... This is a very severe assessment. The problem was a lack of efficiency. This is true.... It is false to say that some people did not want recognition or admission to the United Nations. [passage omitted]

Any Domination Is Doomed to Failure

[Mladenov] Your last address to the public caused great reactions among the official public. Part of this was due to your interpretation of the so-called historical agreement with the Albanians, which Mr. Abdurahman Aliti assessed as lowering the problem to a "communal level."

[Tupurkovski] I do not refer to the historical agreement as a communal question and I simply do not understand why some people call it that. As far as history is concerned, this was not a question that was only raised by the Albanian leaders, but also by a number of Macedonian leaders and by the so-called Macedonian media. [passage omitted] Those who do not have an insight into Macedonian-Albanian relations as well as all other interethnic relations in a multinational state, those who insist on dominating other nations in our complicated national architecture, are doomed to historical failure that will have a very high price.

[Mladenov] The problem between the two communities culminated with the Tetovo university, in which you were involved with your famous telephone contact with Sulejmani [self-proclaimed president of Tetovo university]. What is your definite position concerning this university?

[Tupurkovski] I explained my views in RINES, a newspaper from Pristina, which coincides with my efforts to overcome the situation. Here is an extraordinary example of the manipulation of the Macedonians and the Albanians—it is the Albanian university. The police allegedly protected the Macedonians in the western part of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]... Now we have to ask the Macedonians whether they are safer there, particularly after the celebration of the first anniversary of the university. The Albanians should also be asked whether their educational level has been raised with this university institution. I am in favor of a liberal relationship toward all requests and needs of all the nationalities in the state, and I have a great understanding for this, but I am totally aware that manipulations are not to be used in political goals when the quality of interethnic relations is at stake.

[Mladenov] When you say a liberal relationship, do you refer to cooperation with the Tetovo university?

[Tupurkovski] A liberal relationship means an objective analysis that we can all make concerning the need for education. We will soon see that we are far beyond the world's level, both we, the Macedonians, and the Albanians. There rises the need to overcome the gap in education; this is the moment when we can start discussing the problems of the children, the students, and the families in this process. To politicize the program means to evade responsibility and need for progress in the educational process. If I participate in the political struggle, education will be one of the priority questions for me. [passage omitted]

Assessments From Position of Power Are Dangerous

[Mladenov] Do you think that there are grounds for any communities in Macedonia to believe that they are nationally endangered?

[Tupurkovski] I would not be objective if I did not say that the Albanians have been living for years as unequal in the state. Even if this has to do with irrational feelings, this is what they believe. The feeling of being inferior in a state is potentially catastrophic. One cannot bypass this delicate question no matter how much one tries. These questions have to be opened.

[Mladenov] What is the contribution of the Macedonian side toward this feeling of the Albanians?

[Tupurkovski] We have radicalized the relationship toward national problems in general.... We must start from the fact that Macedonia is a multiconfessional, multinational, and multicultural community. Under such circumstances, majorization cannot solve the differences. Macedonia is too small for such a thing. It is necessary to have a real approach to a society that is as complicated as ours. We need a positive relationship and not radicalizations and threats. We have reached this radicalization not only in the Macedonian but also in the Albanian political fabric. It is good that the radicalization prevails in the political elites and we can still save the quality of the interethnic relations and the determinations for a civic society.

[Mladenov] So, the people are all right, the leaders are bad.

[Tupurkovski] In any case, we cannot say that the people are bad.

[Mladenov] Nevertheless, it is the people who elect these leaders.

[Tupurkovski] The people elect, and they can elect differently.

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[Mladenov] What can make the people elect differently? You have the impression that someone is seriously engaged in solving the interethnic problems in Macedonia.

[Tupurkovski] Unfortunately, I do not have this impression, but this does not release me from the right to act on this plan as a political citizen. We will see how many will follow the same belief. [passage omitted]

[Mladenov] What is your opinion about the conflict in the ruling coalition? Whether you like it or not, your name is involved in this interparty conflict.

[Tupurkovski] I can only give you a general answer—it is impossible to avoid big problems, such as the economic crisis, the social crisis, crime, corruption, the lack of perspectives among the young. Formally, we have a new political system, a new economic system, democratic contents in the political and economic sphere, and one cannot be unsatisfied in this aspect. However, it is hard to assess the real situation positively. I presume that the ruling team knows better about the backgrounds of the disputes than I do.... Where is the reform and all its contents if we have to overcome perpetual crises within the relations of the political leadership?

[Mladenov] What is the motif of this argument in your opinion?

[Tupurkovski] The answer lies in the conclusion of the slowed-down democratic process. The will for its further development is simply lacking. The political leadership is wasting its energy in struggling for personal positions. Apparently, this is an effort for conquering positions or for discrediting somebody else's position because we have not yet heard about the strategic differences between the social democrats and the liberals.

[Mladenov] Do you think that there are no differences between them?

[Tupurkovski] There are not any big differences as far as the program is concerned, they both have a uniform platform. We have not heard about their new possible platform determinations until today.

[Mladenov] Perhaps the difference comes from Mr. Frckovski's analysis in which he says that the liberals are a lobby group of the northern neighbor.

[Tupurkovski] It is wasted energy to prove that some of the parties in Macedonia represent foreign interests. I would never allow myself to give such a judgment without supported arguments.

[Mladenov] There remains the personal character of the conflict.

[Tupurkovski] Most probably it has the dimension of a personal relationship. For me the basic thing is that an interest isl lacking for the promotion of democratic processes which results in a struggle for personal positions. This coalition will be faced with tensions in the social problems and it will cause a terrible fall in the standard of living, which is on the lowest level at present. So, a bigger responsibility is needed and an end has to be put to the struggle for positions in the leadership. I expect the ruling people in the establishment to revive the struggle for reforms and for new perspectives. There is such a possibility.

[Mladenov] Do you not think that this is the right time for new elections?

[Tupurkovski] This is one of the possible solutions and it is not at all dramatic. Dramatic is the fact that the most responsible ones are irresponsible in solving the problems. So, new elections or new alternative future programs will face us with new developments that will certainly lead us to greater democratic prosperity in society. [passage omitted]

Like Gligorov, I Believe Citizens Will Decide About the "Successor"

[Mladenov] We know about your meeting with Gligorov. Can you tell us about the matters that you discussed with him?

[Tupurkovski] I went to visit a friend, a man with whom I cooperated in a very delicate phase of the uprising and constitution of Macedonia's statehood. I was very pleased to see that the president had recovered, that he would soon resume his duties. This is very important because we are extremely fragile in the functions of the constitutionally established power of the three authorities. The efficient function of all three together and of each one of them separately can guarantee protection of our own rights. [passage omitted]

[Mladenov] There is another speculation in connection with Mr. Gligorov. If we know that you did not obstruct his elections twice, it is now allegedly said that it is the president's turn to recommend you as his successor.

[Tupurkovski] I read his new year's interview in NOVA MAKEDONIJA and I share his opinion that only the citizens can elect their next president. It will certainly be of importance if Gligorov favors someone, but I think that the citizens will decide about their new president 100 percent.

[Mladenov] How do you assess the opposition's determination today not to participate in the parliament?

[Tupurkovski] If the government is reasonable, it will know that it needs the opposition the most. We as citizens need it as a corrector, a control. The decisions of

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the opposition depend on it. To have a mentality which claims that everything is possible with majorization or arbitration is a big burden for all of us. The least that every authority organizing elections can do is regular elections, and we do not need to think about this. The question of regular elections is not to be raised here. It is something that is understandable. It would be tragic for Macedonia if it were not so.

[Mladenov] Is there a political potential for such a democratic turning point?

[Tupurkovski] This development is indispensable. New political subjects will be formed in Macedonia. The dissatisfaction and frustrations will be positively directed, although we can expect them to be extreme somewhere. This situation will definitely produce all possible alternatives.

[Mladenov] Why do you think that the elections will be regular and that the West will approve them?

[Tupurkovski] Today as before, the interest of the West is to have a stable Macedonia. This stability will not be opposed by the genuine political factors in the Republic. The passing of time also brings political maturation to all political forces in the state. The new political forces will have to show more quality, because they will abandon the mortgage of the last six to seven years. I expect, due to the Europeanization of the continent, which is in the interest of the Union and undoubtedly of the United States as well, that there will be positive trends in East Europe and we will not be able to stand by. Support will be given to those with constructive political alternatives, which will have to give evidence about democratic and fair elections.

[Mladenov] I am first of all referring to the widespread opinion that this political team is still needed by the West—the name has to be changed.

[Tupurkovski] The awareness among us is that someone is supported and that this support comes from the United States. Although in the present political and diplomatic times there are indications that the United States is making calculations, the basic determinations that are interwoven in democracy are very stable—the authenticity of political expression is the elementary and irreplaceable right of a citizen in a state; there is the belief that genuine political expression is necessary, and we agree with this. Macedonia is the way it is and such calculations are totally unnecessary. It is also unnecessary to bow one's head before any subject in the world. Macedonia has the possibility of enriching its foreign political activities by taking global relations into account. At the same time, the affiliations that are noncritically exposed now should be advanced by permanent search for the priority interests of the state, taking into account the geographical and political position, so as to anticipate the further development of events. I know that they will once again say that I am against the West, the Union, and in favor of regionalization of the Macedonian state, but I will repeat: Macedonia has the interests to use all available opportunities in the neighborhood, in the region, in the East, and in the West.

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Poland: Richard Holbrooke Arrives in Warsaw

LD0602213096 Warsaw PAP in Polish 2057 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 6 Feb—Richard Holbrooke, U.S. assistant secretary of state for Europe and Canada, arrived in Warsaw on the night of 6 February. As he told journalists at the airport, he came "to learn what is going on in Poland."

He denied, however, that one of the main reasons for his visit to Poland had been the so-called Jozef Oleksy case. Holbrooke is accompanied by Dan Fried, director of the Central Europe Department at the National Security Council. Holbrooke said that the purpose of his visit is to meet the new Polish Government and to assure it how important a country Poland has been to the United States and that it will remain so.

Holbrooke added that he would brief Polish politicians on his recent trip to Bosnia. He also expressed appreciation for Polish troops serving in Tuzla, in the American sector of peace forces.

Tomorrow Holbrooke will have meetings with the president, the prime minister-designate, the ministers of foreign affairs and national defense, and the chairmen of parliamentary floor groups. As he said, he was not sure whether he would meet Jozef Oleksy because he did not have a detailed schedule of his meetings in Poland.

Poland: Holbrooke, Dobrzanski Discuss NATO, IFOR

LD0702114696 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1040 GMT 7 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 7 Feb—Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. assistant secretary of state, met with National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski on 7 February. After the meeting, the American guest said that the talks mainly concerned the Polish Army's participation in the Implementation Force [IFOR] operations in Bosnia and the expansion of cooperation between Poland and NATO this year.

Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka, General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, and Nicolas Rey, the U.S. ambassador to Poland, also took part in the talks.

Minister Dobrzanski said after the meeting that he briefed the American guest on "certain tasks" being implemented by the Defense Ministry, which "to a great extent will determine our acceptance into NATO." He also talked about civilian control of the Army. He added that much time was devoted to NATO and the participation of Polish forces in Bosnia. The minister stressed that on those issues the positions of the two politicians were "very close, particularly as far as NATO membership is concerned. One can expect decisions very important to Poland in the fall (at the summit of the heads of the North-Atlantic Alliance member states) (...); certain forecasts may also emerge, which will be important to our aspirations to join NATO."

Asked to comment on the report prepared for the U.S. Congress that describes the military aspects of the acceptance into NATO of the Central European states, Dobrzanski said that this was not discussed. He added, however, that the two sides "are aware of the difficulties when it comes to the passing of this issue through the Congress and that we discussed that; but it does not seem to me that the difficulties are as big as some commentaries picture them."

GAZETA WYBORCZA reports on Wednesday that the authors of the report claim that NATO cannot trust the Polish Army officers because, in their opinion, no personnel changes have been carried out since the change of the political system [in Poland].

Poland: Yeltsin Aide on Polish-Russian Relations, NATO

WS0602143996 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 6 Feb 96 p 6

[Interview with Yevgeniy Kozhokin, Russian presidential aide and director of the Institute of Strategic Studies, by Wieslaw S. Debski; place and date not given: "We Must Not Be Utopian"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Debski] What do you think are the obstacles to a better understanding between Poles and Russians?

[Kozhokin] There are numerous myths about modern-day Russia circulating in Poland. The country the Poles speak of simply does not exist. Those myths are rooted in your past, and that past is unusually complicated. Russia should not be judged on the basis of what it did in the past, in the 18th or 19th century. This is a new state that is currently suffering a very deep crisis, including psychological. This has a huge influence on the behavior of both the Army and the political elites.

There is also the question of the eastward expansion of NATO. If there were more patience in settling the issue definitely on both sides, we would find it easier to communicaate with each other.

[Debski] Do you not think, however, that NATO expansion is being used in Russia for the needs of current politics, in particular the presidential campaign?

[Kozhokin] The communists and nationalists in our country have a different view of the issue than the

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democrats. The democrats have been building their policies on the concept of deep ties to the West and the democratic forces of East Europe. Neither they nor their supporters can understand why a military and political Western pact should be expanded to the east, allowed to approach our borders at a moment when Russia is evolving into a democratic state for the first time in its history.

The communists and nationalists claim that the West has always been hostile toward Russia and wants to weaken it further. Hence the idea of NATO enlargement, which will force Russia to spend more on arms and thus make it weaker.

[Debski] It has already been said in the West, however, that NATO will expand. Will Russia change its stance, or will it cling to it to the very end?

[Kozhokin] During the current meeting, one of the Polish participants in the Polish-Russian roundtable said it has already been decided that NATO is to accept new members. One of the Russian participants who knows the West and Western leaders very well said he is 70 percent sure that NATO will not expand.

There are differences of opinion on how the West will react. I think this will largely depend on how the situation in Russia develops.

[Debski] This will undoubtedly be a problem that will make cooperation between our states difficult for several more years. Could we thus shelve the issue of Poland's membership in NATO and develop other areas of bilateral relations?

[Kozhokin] Let us not be utopian. We cannot shelve this issue no matter how hard we want to. We can, however, further develop bilateral relations and look for other fields of cooperation at the same time, regardless of whether NATO expands. During these roundtable talks, we agreed that Poland's membership in the EU, coupled by the development of economic cooperation with Russia, establishing specific economic ties between our countries, could enable Poland to strengthen its position in the EU on the one hand, and help us develop more intense cooperation with the EU on the other. We are very interested in that.

Poland: NATO Head Interviewed on Expansion, Russia

WS0702124796 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Feb 96 p 6

[Report by Malgorzata Grzelec from Brussels: "NATO Secretary General Javier Solana: Poland Welcome in the Atlantic Alliance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Secretary General of NATO Javier Solana said during a talk with Polish journalists at NATO Headquarters in Brussels that he would soon pay a visit to Poland. The date was not yet revealed, but the visit is probably scheduled for the spring. Solana is planning to go to Moscow in March.*

He would like to say in our country that Poland is welcome in the European structures and NATO, and that the alliance is continuing its dialogue with Warsaw. The dialogue is part of the Partnership for Peace, and its purpose is to "get to know each other better and to adjust to one another better, so that at the moment of expansion everyone is prepared as well as possible." Solana is going to tell the Russians that it is NATO's wish to maintain as good relations with them as possible. He would also like to explain to the Russians the significance of the tasks the alliance is facing, including the expansion process.

The secretary general of NATO confirmed that the decision to admit new member states had already been made and that it is a step toward a Europe that is safer—for Russia as well. "This decision will not be changed by any statements made by politicians in Moscow," he announced.

Asked whether he agrees with President Aleksander Kwasniewski's opinion that Russia primarily fears the alliance itself, not its expansion, he replied that he did not get such an impression. "The Russians should not be afraid because NATO expansion is not aimed against anyone," Solana said.

He also explained that he does not think the internal, as he put it, "politically difficult" situation in our country would make it more difficult for Poland to join NATO, as long as Poland "stays a democratic state and abides by the principles of a market economy."

Poland: Supreme Court Judge To Head Justice Ministry

LD0602172596 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Leszek Kubicki, Supreme Court judge and the editor in chief of the STATE AND LAW magazine, has said that he has accepted the proposal to

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take over the post of minister of justice in Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's government.

Judge Kubicki added that he was not linked to any political orientation, although, some time ago, he was a member of the Polish United Workers Party.

Poland: Cimoszewicz Government To Be Sworn in 7 Feb

LD0702130696 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1256 GMT 7 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 7 Feb—The new government of Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz will be sworn it at the presidential palace at 1500 hours, the government information center has announced. At about 1530 hours, Jozef Oleksy will hand over his post to Prime Minister Cimoszewicz.

Poland: Journalist Sentenced on State Secrets Charge

LD0602183696 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1735 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 6 Feb—On 6 February, the Provincial Court in Warsaw decided to sentence Jerzy Urban, editor in chief of the NIE weekly, to one year's imprisonment suspended for two years, to ban him from holding the post of editor in chief and working as a journalist for one year, and to require him to pay a fine of 10,000 zlotys for revealing state secrets. Urban described the sentence as shocking and announced that he will submit an appeal.

After a trial that lasted one day, held behind closed doors, the court found Urban guilty of breaching the state secrets act by his publication in 1992 of the operational acts of the SB [Security Service] concerning an agent code-named "Zapalniczka" [Lighter] (Zdzislaw Najder was alleged to be the agent).

At the same time, the court changed the legal classification of the offense, having decided that Urban revealed not a state secret that was "important to state security" but a secret that "could harm important interests of the state." According to the court, the publication of an SB secret operational message constituted a breach of law. The message revealed the method and forms of work of the security bodies, personal data of the SB employees, and data concerning "persons collaborating."

In a justification of the judgment, delivered in court, Judge Pawel Rysinski said that Urban had broken the law, being fully aware that the materials he was revealing were covered by the state secrets act. The court pointed out that Urban, as a government member in 1982, had signed appropriate documents on the principles of keeping official secrets, so he could not explain his conduct by saying that he did not know the law.

When justifying the ban on Urban from pursuing his journalist profession, the court said that Urban had abused the profession by committing the offense. The chairman of the board of judges pointed out that the trial was not "a repression against freedom of speech, but a response to the lack of responsibility for one's words."

After the judgment was passed, Urban said that, while the verdict is still subject to appeal, he will continue writing his articles for NIE. He added that he is being banned from practicing his profession for the third time. However, this is the first time it was done by a court of law.

Poland: Urban Condemns Sentence, Court Publishing Ban

LD0702111796 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0700 GMT 7 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Jerzy Urban has described his sentence as shocking. He announced that he will submit an appeal. He also said that state offices should protect their secrets themselves, rather than accusing journalists of revealing them. He expressed the conviction that pressure from the press and some political groupings likely to be aroused by the judgment will result in a change to the state secrets law, so that those not obliged by the nature of their job to keep state secrets would not be required to keep such secrets.

[Begin Urban recording] I think that in a sense this sentence will be rather useful because it will create the right pressure in the right direction, so that the law on state secrets will no longer contain a provision requiring the protection of secrets from people to whom such secrets are not revealed by the nature of their office. Official institutions should protect their secrets. If they are incapable of doing that, they should not accuse journalists of using, for political aims, secrets that are leaking from the state apparatus like water from a broken pipe. [end recording]

Poland: Security Service Denies Dismissal of Chief

LD0602124096 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1100 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Maria Krystyna Boral from the UOP [State Protection Office] press section has denied press reports about the alleged dismissal of the UOP head, General Gromoslaw Czempinski. The press had reported that Gen. Czempinski was to hand in his resignation to Prime Minister Cimoszewicz. Krystyna

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Boral says that the UOP head went on a week's leave yesterday.

[Begin recording] [Boral] UOP head, General Gromoslaw Czempinski, after the second round of the presidential elections, put himself at the disposal of Prime Minister Oleksy. This fact is public knowledge and we confirm it. But we do not confirm that Gen. Czempinski has been dismissed. [end recording]

[Unidentified correspondent] Does this mean that Gen. Czempinski has not even made a proposal to Prime Minister Cimoszewicz that he be allowed to resign?

[Boral] As of today, there has been no mention of any resignation. [end recording]

Poland: Former Soviet Official on Walesa's Moscow Ties

WS0602125796 Warsaw NIE in Polish 1 Feb 96 p 3

[Interview with Aleksander Oskin, author of article entitled "Superspy" in RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, by Krzysztof Pilawski; place and date not given: "Walesa as Appetizer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Walesa and his people maintained clandestine contacts with the Soviets in the late 1980's; they tried to reach an agreement with them behind Jaruzelski's back. Walesa and Geremek reacted angrily to the article written by Aleksander Oskin in RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA.*

Who is Oskin? In a book entitled Spies, or Secrets of Polish Intelligence *Kaszynski and Podgorski write the following: "It was not a secret in leadership circles of one of the biggest youth organizations that in the early 1980's the director of the Polish section of the Komsomol was a cadre employee of the KGB. His knowledge of the situation in Poland, of the cadre and organizational problems, was impressive."*

In the years 1985-90, Oskin was one of the first secretaries of the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw. Officially delegated by the Komsomol, his task was to tighten the friendship between young people in Poland and the Soviet Union. When he returned from his post in Poland, Oskin's career declined. For a couple of years he got stuck in the insignificant RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA. Last year he became a director general in Sevodnya-Press, a distributor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and a few dozen other titles of the publisher under the same name. The authors of "Spies" refer to Oskin as "a well-known entrepreneur who cooperates chiefly with former Polish activists of the youth movement." This statement is an exaggeration. Oskin received me in a tiny little office on Pravda Street, in which it would have been hard for me to find any luxury goods that are characteristic of the so-called new Russians.

[Pilawski] You claim that Walesa secretly met with Soviet Ambassador to Poland Brovikov. The former president denies this; he demands concrete dates. Now, could you be more specific?

[Oskin] I can tell you about a meeting that I arranged myself. I contacted Pusz about it. In the morning Walesa talked with Mieczyslaw Rakowski, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]; later on he took part at a New Year's dinner on Sejm premises. We had an appointment to meet at 1300, but the dinner was longer than expected. Geremek did his best to dissuade Walesa from meeting with Brovikov. Even as he went to see him off in the car, he asked Walesa not to go to our embassy. He thought that the contacts should be maintained by other people. Nonetheless, Walesa did go to the meeting. Precisely at 1420 Brovikov received him—not officially in the embassy, but in his apartment at the back of the embassy premises. They talked without witnesses. Walesa was hoping that Brovikov would hand him an invitation to pay a visit to Moscow. Unfortunately, the ambassador had only an oral invitation from Shevardnadze. This got Walesa riled. He left for the airport, from where he flew to Gdansk.

[Pilawski] What about other meetings?

[Oskin] I know for certain that there were other meetings, even though I am not able to give any details. Brovikov paid visits to Gdansk only to talk to Walesa. We were interested in how the Solidarity leader saw future Polish-Russian relations and what guarantees he could give us. These were the most important meetings. They were preceded by lower-level contacts. Walesa's advisers were constantly in touch with our representatives.

[Pilawski] Geremek declared that this entire article of yours was trumped up and that he does not know anything about contacts between Solidarity and the Soviet Embassy.

[Oskin] That is not true. The meetings held between Walesa and Brovikov resulted from regular contacts that advisers to the Solidarity leader had with us much earlier.

[Pilawski] Are you also talking about Geremek now?

[Oskin] Yes, I am.

[Pilawski] Any details?

[Oskin] This is enough for the time being. I think that, in the event of a necessity, appropriate documents can

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be found in the archives of the president, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB. Materials of this type are kept for an exceptionally long time.

[Pilawski] Walesa, Geremek... Who else?

[Oskin] We had contacts with the closest intellectual entourage of Walesa. I will not reveal any names. They did not want to be in the limelight—unlike, for example, Moczulski [leader of the Confederation for an Independent Poland], with whom we even led a 40-minute public discussion on Polish television. Does this mean that Moczulski was a KGB agent? Obviously it does not. He presented me with his views on relations with the Soviet Union and on our country, and I assured him that I would relay all these opinions in Moscow.

[Pilawski] In what period did Solidarity develop closer contacts with the Soviet Embassy?

[Oskin] In the period of preparations for the Round Table,. it became clear that a process of working out a new political structure was under way. It was obvious that it was a game that would end in the relinquishing of power. Now the question was whether this would be a peaceful process, whether Moscow would intervene. At that moment the Soviet Union was following developments in Poland with concern, and we were interested in developing contacts with the opposition and the church. First of all, with Solidarity and Walesa.

[Pilawski] What for?

[Oskin] We wanted to obtain information directly from the opposition structures; they deliberately wanted to pass it on to Moscow. It was not a coincidence that, after each meeting with a Solidarity representative, we assured him that his information would be relayed to the Soviet authorities. In this way we built a Solidarity-Moscow information channel.

[Pilawski] What did this look like from the technical point of view?

[Oskin] We selected a person who was close to the Solidarity leadership; it was usually someone that we knew did not dislike Russia. We sent a signal that we would like to arrange a meeting. This person thought about it, sought advice, and made a decision. We made appointments to meet in restaurants, cafes, and, later on, private apartments as well. We began by complimenting him on his knowledge of the language, as well as with talks on Dostoyevskiy or on the first night of a play in a Warsaw theater. Step by step we paved the way. Our interlocutor gave us the information that the opposition of the Solidarity circle wanted to go to Moscow. We, in turn, presented signals that Moscow sent to the [trade] union and Walesa. These signals were always treated seriously.

[Pilawski] How often did you meet your "secret informer"?

[Oskin] On average, every other week, depending on a given situation.

[Pilawski] Would you tell us where those meetings were held?

[Oskin] The Na Rozdrozu Cafe, the Ambasador Restaurant; later on there were also meetings at the Victoria Hotel. Restaurants in Wilanow were quite popular as well.

[Pilawski] Who paid the bills?

[Oskin] Poles always know how to behave in such situations, but, as a matter of fact, this did not matter at all. This was not haggling. It was discussion of politics, the future, power. These meetings were important and useful for both sides. They allowed Moscow to get a better understanding of developments in Poland; they eased tension. Our interlocutors calmed us down and argued that power in their hands would not spell a tragedy for interstate relations. They wanted to prevent possible violent steps on the part of the Soviet Union when they were taking over power in Poland.

[Pilawski] How important were such declarations to you?

[Oskin] They gave us certain guarantees. After all, the most important thing to us at that time was the future of the Warsaw Pact and the issue of maintaining the postwar order in Europe. We feared that pro-Western trends would prevail in Poland, that Warsaw would choose the West—first of all the Federal Republic of Germany—and that it would turn its back on Moscow. This threatened to upset the geopolitical balance in Europe. Therefore, it was very important for us to listen to the force that was pushing its way to take over power. By predicting the victory of Solidarity, we wanted to build the foundations of future understanding and cooperation between our countries.

[Pilawski] However, what was the value of guarantees given by people who were not in power?

[Oskin] Solidarity representatives kept persuading their Soviet interlocutors that they were a civilized force, that they were sufficiently reasonable to recognize the importance of the Soviet Union in Europe. As they assured us, for this reason, once they came to power, our relations would certainly be friendly, if not fraternal. And for this reason they should not be feared.

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[Pilawski] Did these guarantees boil down to oral declarations on good intentions made at a cafe table?

[Oskin] Please understand one thing: At the end of each of these meetings, a code message was sent to Moscow. The main task of a Soviet diplomat was to provide the center with detailed information. Depending on the rank of the interlocutor and the content of the message, the code messages were addressed to different institutions. The most important ones were sent to the Politburo. If someone doubts this, it can be checked. If not now, then in a few years' time the archives can be opened; then it can be checked who said what.

[Pilawski] These were most certainly people who made up Walesa's closest entourage?

[Oskin] Yes, they were, and they made it a point to stress that they wanted their guarantees to reach Moscow.

[Pilawski] Are there any files on your interlocutors in the KGB archives? There is talk that, for example, Oleksy had not only a file in the KGB, but also a pseudonym.

[Oskin] When I worked in Warsaw, Oleksy was one of the 49 voivodship PZPR secretaries. From Moscow's point of view, he was a minor party activist with limited contacts and limited knowledge. Why buy water if you are in the river? As for information on the PZPR, the Armed Forces, and the economy, we obtained it at the highest level; after all, they were our allies and they did not withhold any information from us. As far as I know, neither Oleksy nor Walesa's aides were KGB agents. The difference between our contacts with representatives of the Polish authorities and with opposition representatives was quite fundamental: The former were open and natural, whereas the latter were clandestine, behind-the-scenes. As for the files, there can be files on anyone because many institutions have dossiers on subjects and people they are interested in. I have never seen KGB files. Even if they exist, only one person or a few people in the state have access to them.

[Pilawski] Did your interlocutors meet their commitments once they came to power?

[Oskin] I cannot accuse anyone of being dishonest. I believe that our contacts made it possible to soften Polish-Soviet relations in the period when power was being taken over by other people. I want to stress that in Solidarity there were two lobbies: a pro-Moscow lobby and an anti-Moscow one. Of course, we had contacts mainly with the former.

[Pilawski] In the late 1980's, there was talk in Warsaw of secret diplomatic ties between Solidarity and the Soviet Embassy. These were mainly rumors and speculations. Did you inform the authorities of the Polish People's Republic about your meetings? If you did, how detailed was the information you provided?

[Oskin] I believe that the Polish authorities knew there were such contacts. However, neither we nor our interlocutors told them about the contacts. After all, they looked upon this as a clandestine channel of providing information to an alien state. Still, it was not activity against Poland or the Soviet Union. Solidarity had a chance to get better acquainted with the abominable Moscow, whereas Moscow was able to get to know the abominable Solidarity.

[Pilawski] That means that this was a useful activity. Why, then, did Walesa react so angrily to your article?

[Oskin] I often visited Gdansk. I know that NIE publishes articles critical of Father Jankowski. I do not share this opinion; I respect him very much. Jankowski told me once that more and more idiots were beginning to surround Walesa. He put it even more bluntly: "He hears me but does not listen to me," Jankowski complained. Well, at the time when Walesa was coming to power, he did listen to wise people—also wise information from Moscow. I wish a wise informer, a good information channel, would appear beside Lech Walesa now.

Poland: Search for Ambassador for Moscow Inconclusive

WS0602145796 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 6 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Cezary Gmyz: "Overdue Ambassadors Awaiting Replacements"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Now that Sergey Krylov has announced that he will take over as head of the Russian Embassy in Warsaw, finding a replacement for Ciosek has become a burning issue. Meanwhile, the coalition, now that Drawicz has declined the office, is finding it difficult to come up with an adequate candidate. Whoever goes to Moscow has to know Russian and English and have some experience in the diplomatic service.*

Both our ambassador to Moscow, Stanislaw Ciosek, and the Russian ambassador to Poland, Yuriy Kashlev, have been in their offices for nearly six years. This is very long by diplomatic service standards. Their replacement has been expected for several months. Ciosek handed in his resignation in March of last year and announced that he would be back home in time for Christmas. His mission, however, has been prolonged yet again, this time for half a year.

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We obtained confirmation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] that the Russians are to replace their ambassador soon. The new one will most probably be current Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Krylov.

"If this is true, Poland should send someone of comparable authority to Moscow, even though protocol does not require it. It would show, however, that we treat relations with that state very seriously," [former] Prime Minister Oleksy's aide on Russian affairs, Andrzej Drawicz, told ZYCIE WARSZAWY.

The search for Ciosek's replacement has been futile. Now that the Russians have made their announcement, this has become a very burning issue. Thus far, the only potential candidate for the post has been Drawicz. However, he obstinately refuses to go to Moscow.

Moscow, apart from Washington and Bonn, is considered to be the most important Polish mission. "The ideal candidate should be a seasoned diplomat and speak fluent English and Russian. Even though the majority of activists from the Social Democracy of the Polish Democracy speak Russian, they hardly meet the remaining requirements," a high-ranking MSZ officer told ZYCIE WARSZAWY.

Poland: NBP Criticizes Kolodko's 'Package 2000'

WS0702120196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 6 Feb 96 p 15

[Article by Konrad Sadurski: "The NBP on 'Package 2000'; Incoherent Optimism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The National Bank of Poland [NBP] claims that "Package 2000" provides for numerous targets, the concurrent implementation of which might prove impossible.*

The "Strategy for Poland-Package 200" project developed by Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko provides for, among other things, reducing the inflation rate to a level of 5 percent by the end of the century, maintaining the current rate of economic growth, and encouraging saving measures.

"The targets outlined in the 'Package' are very attractive, yet the project providing for their concurrent implementation is incoherent," said NBP President Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz yesterday.

She claims that the assumption that the current rate of economic growth could be kept up until the end of the century is overly optimistic. After the high growth of the GNP by 7 percent last year, the NBP projects that this year it will be lower, at a level of 5.5 percent. The Central Planning Office, the Independent Center for Economic Studies, and the Institute for Research on the Market Economy have all come up with similar projections.

The NBP is not enthusiastic about the project because it predicts that economic activity in such countries as Germany, the major recipient of our products, will slacken. This might weaken our exports.

This year exports are expected to grow more slowly than imports anyway.

The assumption is based on the fact that the zloty has strengthened in comparison with other currencies and that barriers to imports have been eliminated, which encourages bringing in products from abroad. Imports of consumer goods will probably grow because the "Package" projects a growth of consumption.

The NBP also has its reservations about the projected rate of growth of investments. If investments are to boost economic growth, they will simultaneously cause imports to grow. This in turn may, according to President Gronkiewicz-Waltz, cause devaluation pressure, which will make another target provided for in the "Package," curbing inflation, unachievable.

"Limiting the state deficit that the 'Package' provides for will make it easier to fight inflation," said the NBP. The central bank added that it would be impossible, however, unless a reform of the social security system is carried out and privatization continued. The NBP does, however, applaud the idea of lowering taxes. The bank warns: "Budget spending will have to be limited, and that requires social consent."

Poland: Army To Draft More Than 100,000 Men This Year

WS0602145696 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 6 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by "(kf)": "The Army Will Draft Over 100,000 Men This Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This year's draft will begin on 18 March and last until 5 June, the Department of Civic Affairs at the Interior Ministry responsible for its organizing announced.

Draftees born in 1977 and older ones who have not yet been summoned will stand before recruitment and medical commissions. Some 350 regional draft commissions are to be organized nationwide. They will register the recruits, file health certificates, issue military identification booklets, and review appeals.

"Our needs are relatively stable," said Commander Roman Dankowiakowski of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. "Throughout the year we will need to recruit some 120,000-130,000 men."

An estimated 300,000 draftees may be expected to stand before the draft commissions.

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Romania: Senator Only Sees NATO Entry With Hungary

AU0602182396 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 2 Feb 96 p 6

[Report by Cristina Wlassopol: "In Front of NATO's 'Door'—We Are Connected to Hungary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Senate Defense Committee held a working meeting with a delegation including members of the training staff and Army officers studying at the General Staff Superior College. Presenting the point of view of the defense panel, its chairman, Radu Timofte, told them that U.S. representatives at NATO asserted that the first batch of countries to be admitted to that body consists of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. In 1996 one can note that NATO froze its eastward expansion plans due to the elections to be held this year in these countries, as well as the conflict in Bosnia. Despite the fact that, as it was said, the most Romania can hope for in its integration is to remain a perpetual candidate, the chairman of the defense committee still hopes that our country will be included among the first batch. He claims that Hungary will not join NATO without Romania, nor the other way around. Personally, the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] senator believes that "the airport in Timisoara may be used by the Russian of North Atlantic forces, while the Danube River could become a bond between East and West." Radu Timofte maintains that NATO cannot afford to ignore the existence of Dobrogea and that possibly an airport could be built here.

Romania: Turkey To Assist in Armored Amphibious Carrier

AU0602171196 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 1 Feb 96 p 5

[Report by Daniel Capatos: "Romania and Turkey To Manufacture Armored Amphibious Carrier"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, Army Corps General Dumitru Cioflina, the chief of the Romanian Army General Staff, returned home from Turkey, where he held talks with Turkish Defense Minister Vefa Tanir. Romanian-Turkish cooperation in the domain of armament industry is focusing on the elaboration of a new type of armored amphibious carrier for infantry units. Its prototype was tested over six months and now they are to evaluate the number of orders to be expected in the two countries and, possibly, also on third markets.

During his talks with the Turkish defense minister, Vefa Tanir, the latter stated that he wishes Romania to join a partnership relation of which Turkey is already a part. "The two countries will become key elements of peace in the Balkans and we also hope to become partners in NATO," stated Tanir at the conclusion of his talks with Gen. Cioflina.

Romania: Unions Warn Defense Industry Lacks 'Strategy'

AU0602181896 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 1 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Constantin Misenschi: "Do Not Shoot at the Defense Industry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the problems of the country's defense industry have been given intensive media coverage in the past year, the relevant government officials could not find any solutions to these problems. The "Solidaritate 90" [Solidarity 90] Trade Union Federation and the Chemistry and Petrochemistry Trade Union Federation, with branches in two enterprises in this field—RATMIL and ROMPIRO Fagaras—have rung the alarm bells. Mr. Cristian Antemir, leader of "Solidarity 90" said at a recent news conference: "At this time, these enterprises are faced with the old problem of lack of orders, a matter which it is largely up to the Army to solve. Therefore, they are short of funds and have been warned by RENEL [Romanian Electric Power Authority] to pay their debts."

Likewise, one can feel the lack of strategy in the defense industry, where no basic changes are to be expected. The existence of these shortcomings was also reiterated by the representatives of the employees of the two enterprises ROMPIRO Fagaras and RATMIL. New and substantial funds are needed to preserve these industrial capacities, while the technical unemployment sanctioned by Law No. 78/1995 was only a temporary solution for management. The result of this indifference is that over 50,000 employees in this field will become fully unemployed, with practically no solution for retraining certain categories of employees.

The conclusion reached by the trade unions is that Law No. 78/1995 is but an intermediary step toward fully laying off more than two thirds of the defense industry personnel and depriving these economic units of capital. In practical terms, everything happening now is at odds with the declared desire to be accepted in the NATO structures.

The trade union leaders said that in case of an armed conflict, three months will be needed to reopen the industrial capacities temporarily closed down at this time.

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Romania: Reportage on Secret PNTCD-PAC Talks

AU0602181396 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 2 Feb 96 p 7

[Report by Vali Iorga: "The PAC Is Secretly Meeting With the PNTCD"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] denied the news, while the PAC [Civic Alliance Party] gave details. In other words, after the PNTCD leadership denied that it had received an offer from the PAC, Nicolae Manolescu [PAC president] contradicted the denial. The PAC president said that negotiations were under way with the PNTCD and they had already found converging points. Manolescu seemed very optimistic about these talks and was certain that something would be achieved. He believes that the national interest should be considered the highest priority. As for the PNTCD's fear that it will be scolded for these talks by its allies within the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania, from which the PAC was excluded in 1995], Manolescu does not consider this a tragedy. "Let them attack the PNTCD now but then win the elections, rather than attack it after they lose the elections," concluded the PAC president.

Romania: Antochi Elected Bucharest's PDAR President

AU0602171296 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 29 Jan 96 p 7

[Report by M.S. "Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania Is Sowing Its Political Seed To Sprout in the Trampled Soil of Bucharest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems that the political seed of the agrarian party does not freeze at 10 degrees below zero. The PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania] Municipality Organization conference was held at Bucharest Casa Universitarilor on Saturday, 27 January, in the surprising absence of its President Victor Surdu. Although PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] and MER [Romanian Ecological Movement] were included on the list of invited guests, they did not send their representatives. However, the respective absence was compensated by the "messengers" of the PAC [Civic Alliance Party], PSDR [Romanian Social-Democratic Party], PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], PSM [Socialist Party of Labor], and PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party]. The speech made by Senator Ioan Coja, PDAR vice president, at the opening of the conference proceedings was made perfectly plain when he said that: "the majority got their wealth through corruption and fraud." Some agreed with his statement, others considered him hardheaded; in any event, most of the speakers referred to his speech, even if some of them got "confused"—maybe out of pure habit—and used the word "comrade" (?!). The agrarian Vice President Dumitru Teaci, read the Bucharest branch's message to the inhabitants of the capital city, in which he stressed "the sins of the current administration" and told the voters that the only chance for a lucrative change would be to vote for the ear of corn [the PDAR's sign]. Gheorghe Antochi was elected president of the PDAR Bucharest branch. The Conference elected the members of the municipality council and the candidates for the party's national council. Likewise, the following members were proposed for the position of party president: Gheorghe Antochi, Ioan Coja, Gheorghe Glaman, Constantin Diaconescu, Dumitru Teaci, and the current President Victor Surdu. Ioan Coja, Victor Surdu, and Dumitru Teaci aspire for the position of Romania's president, but the decision will be made by the PDAR Congress. As for the Bucharest mayor's office, the agrarians fully support Constantin Carbunaru for the seat of general mayor, who, when asked to convey a specific message said: "We do not give lessons to other candidates." The agrarians support Alecu Ion and Mihai Lazar for the position of deputy mayor.

Romania: PD VP Views 7-Percent 'Electoral Threshold'

AU0602145296 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 1 Feb 96 p 6

[Interview with Bogdan Niculescu-Duvaz, vice president of the Democratic Party, by Cristina Wlassopol; place and date not given: "The 7-Percent Electoral Threshold Is Used as a Blackmail Element"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Wlassopol] Mr. Bogdan Niculescu-Duvaz, what is your opinion regarding the fact that the government supported Russia's admission to the Council of Europe?

[Niculescu-Duvaz] I believe that the ruling party and the government are in a somewhat delicate situation as they contradicted the opinion of the majority of the European parliamentarians. This does not mean that Russia should not have joined the Council of Europe, rather that there should not be double standards, one for the large countries and a different one for the small countries. Their set of rules should have been applied to Russia, too! In my opinion, they should not have lowered the standard of minimal preconditions that Russia should comply with to be allowed to join the Council of Europe.

[Wlassopol] What is the opinion of the PD [Democratic Party] about the proposal made by the Juridical Commission to raise the electoral threshold to 7 percent

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[limiting access to Parliament for parties that obtain a smaller proportion of the cast votes].

[Niculescu-Duvaz] We agreed to have a 5-percent threshold, but the 7-percent one is used as a blackmail element. However, we believe that we have to display a rational stance. If we accept the 7-percent threshold, there would be four parties in Parliament, which, together, would reflect the option of 50 or 60 percent of the electorate. That means a considerable part of the electors' options would be excluded. Second, I do not know what makes them think that this proposal of theirs will be passed by Parliament.

[Wlassopol] What is your opinion on the Senate proposal by which the political parties should have at least 10,000 members distributed in at least 21 different county branches?

[Niculescu-Duvaz] The measures taken in our country are always just formal ones. It is a known thing that parties can be strong or weak judging from the ideas they stand for and what they do, rather than the number of their members. The PD, which has 10 times 10,000 members and 41 county branches spread all over the country, does not considers this a problem. The quantitative criterion, however, is a new and artificial element, and it should not be taken into consideration. In stable democracies very strong parties have 30,000 to 35,000 members, but this is not something that defines their strength. Nevertheless, one thing is certain, namely, that we cannot maintain the old law on the political parties, which was passed immediately after the birth of democracy in Romania, according to which 251 members are sufficient to set up political parties!

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Slovenia: Talks Held on Cooperation With Croatia

AU0602155296 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation of the foreign affairs commission of the Croatian Sabor headed by Zarko Domljan, president of the commission, is visiting Slovenia. The guests met with State Chamber Speaker Jozef Skoljc and were acquainted with the work of the Slovene parliament in the electoral year. They also studied the cooperation between the members of parliaments of both countries. The Croatian delegation also met with the representatives of the State Chamber committee for international relations, headed by Borut Pahor. The talks took place behind closed doors. It is expected that the guests will also be received by Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler for separate talks.

Talks with a Croatian Foreign Ministry delegation, headed by Hijadet Biscevic, also took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs today. They discussed the experiences and the position toward the European Union, relations with Italy, and open issues between the countries.

Slovenia: Open Issues With Croatia Discussed

AU0602200696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1800 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] As already reported, a delegation of the Croatian Sabor foreign affairs committee visited the State Chamber today. The delegation, which was headed by the committee's president, Dr. Zarko Domljan, arrived at the invitation of Borut Pahor, acting president of our committee for international relations. The members of the delegation were also received by State Chamber Speaker Jozef Skoljc this morning.

At the afternoon news conference, Zarko Domljan and Borut Pahor spoke about the purpose of the visit and the outcome of the talks. Here is a report by Nadja Pengov:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] Judging from the statements, the talks were frank and realistic and represented a step forward after the deadlock in the relations between the parliaments. The talks are supposed to represent a new phase in the relations whereby the countries would solve open issues. The Slovene side raised an initiative for the signing of an agreement on division of the financial obligations stemming from the Rome Treaty. Dr. Domljan concurs that the Rome Treaty must be realized in its entirety. As he said, the proposed ratio of 60:40 is acceptable for the Croatian side.

Both parliamentary delegations share an identical stance on the succession of the disintegrated Yugoslavia. Regarding the drawing of the international border, the purpose of the meeting, as Borut Pahor said, was not to form a uniform stance. They established certain differences and were of the opinion:

[Pahor] That it is primarily the task of the mixed diplomatic commission to try and find solutions acceptable to both sides that will, of course, honor the principles of the international law and acknowledge legal and historic facts that are, naturally, also relevant for the drawing of the border between the countries.

[Pengov] Croatia's stance is:

[Domjan, in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed translation into Slovene] Croatia will insist on the principles of international maritime law, however, regarding the maritime sailing regime, it is open to the most tolerant and liberal solution. Also, perhaps it would pay to request international arbitration in the points where it is not possible to find an agreement.

[Pengov] Both parliamentary delegations expressed a desire that the countries would sign the agreements that have already been drafted. Among these is also the agreement on Krsko nuclear power plant. [end recording]

Slovenia: Thaler Comments on Relations With Croatia

AU0602200896 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1800 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation of the foreign affairs committee of the Croatian Sabor was also received by Slovene Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler. Here is a report by Igor Juric:

[Begin recording] [Juric] Foreign Minister Thaler said that both sides agreed that the atmosphere in the Slovene-Croatian relations should be improved, in which both parliaments could play a very important role, because:

[Thaler] The parliaments are the ones that control both governments and compel them to do more or less in bilateral relations.

[Juric] Thaler voiced satisfaction that the talks in the State Chamber were also successful because he believes that the parliaments, through pressure on both governments, should accelerate the negotiations. Thaler then added:

[Thaler] The negotiations will be speeded up once there is more openness for the mutual nature of interests, for compromises, and for the acknowledgement of the interests of both sides. [end recording]

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Slovenia: Weekly Analyzes ZLSD Departure
AU0602214996

[FBIS Report] Ljubljana MAG in Slovene in its 31 January issue on pages 20 to 24 carries an analysis by Vinko Vasle of the reasons and motives for the departure of the United List of Social Democrats [ZLSD] from the government coalition.

Despite various interpretations of the ZLSD's departure, "ranging from the fear that it represents new tactics employed by Erjavceva Street, where the headquarters of the president of the republic are situated, to the opinion that the shock in the ZLSD leadership following the prime minister's announcement that he would replace Economics Minister Maks Tajnikar was genuine," Vasle also points to a third possibility, namely, that "the experiment with a coalition in which the center linked two mutually exclusive poles" failed and that Drnovsek realized that "the political reality favors more the formation of a new, center-right government and that a center-left option would compromise him and affect his future political career."

Vasle lists numerous "traps" into which the coalition stumbled "courtesy of Kocijancic's United List," such as the conflict with the Catholic Church over denationalization, the Depala Vas incident "which is gaining new dimensions of an organized conspiracy against Janez Jansa," and the TAM [Automobile and Motor Factory Maribor] affair, all crowned "by the conflict with the pensioners, cooked up by the United List, from which Drnovsek and his party were supposed to emerge as the losing side."

In a way, the resulting breakdown in the coalition helped clarify the political scene, Vasle writes; however, on the other hand it rendered it "schizophrenic." As he points out, the departure of the ZSLD resulted in the creation of two opposition blocks or rather, as Vasle explains, "we got a natural coalition and an unnatural opposition. It is in the opposition where the disagreements and tensions that have so far brewed within the tripartite coalition will be vented until the elections."

Although the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS] and the Christian Democrats hold 45 of the 90 seats in the parliament, Vasle believes that "with a sensible policy" the coalition could also count on the votes of what he calls "A-opposition" parties, meaning the Slovene Peoples Party [SLS], the Social Democratic Party [SDSS], and the independent deputies. Here, Vasle is not overtly concerned with the SLS's announcement that it would stay in the opposition, pointing out that the new Economics Minister Dragonja is "very close to this party."

"Jansa's Social Democrats were probably hurt most because they have been pushed into the opposition with the United List, a party that is painstakingly trying to prove that it is the original and the only true social democratic orientation. This party is playing an entirely different and opposite role from the SDSS because it is dividing the parties of the Slovene spring and, as of late, also attacking Drnovsek and the LDS."

Vasle recaps that the crisis started with Dr. Drnovsek announcing the replacement of Minister Tajnikar only minutes after the parliament passed changes to the pensions law, which the United List had opposed adamantly. Drnovsek had several good reasons to end "the pensioners conflict" with the replacement of the minister in question; the two issues, however, were not directly connected. One of the reasons for Tajnikar's replacement, Vasle speculates, was the fact that Drnovsek was anxious to prevent the parliamentary interpellation of Tajnikar, which could also have turned against himself and Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari. "More than an attack on Minister Tajnikar, the interpellation actually sounded like a showdown with Drnovsek and his party," Vasle writes.

He puts the above facts in the perspective of the elections and continues: "TAM is too complicated a story for the average voter to grasp in all its dimensions, and experiences from abroad show that, in such affairs, voters resort to a very simple formula—they interpret the matter politically, as a conflict for prestige on the party scene and usually not even the criminal details can convince them otherwise. Politically, it would, therefore, not make much sense to play up this card," Vasle concludes and explains that, for that reason, the United List "laid another, cleverer trap for Janez Drnovsek," in the form of an issue that would allow for considerably more political demagogy and also resonate in public, namely, the changes to the pension legislation. "Pensioners, a good quarter of the electorate, the majority of whom probably heard nothing less than that the coalition would cut their pensions, formed an important battleground for a big political and also inter-coalition conflict." As Vasle points out, the ZLSD opposing the changes to the pensions legislation was "in the electoral campaign, definitely an achievement that the pensioners will not forget easily, and it is a question of how much the Liberal Democrats have lost by it."

However, as Vasle continues, pensioners' welfare was not the only issue close to the ZLSD's heart: "The reform of the pensions system was not needed to start the necessary reforms of the pensions system, which has been drowning in losses and has been on the brink of financial collapse for years, but to patch up a hole in the state treasury and the newly adopted budget that

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opened when the government decided to cut employers' contribution by 2.7 percent. Without a new financial source, this hole could expand to 30 billion tolars. In public, Drnovsek, of course, skillfully portrayed the lifting of the burden from the economy as his personal achievement and partially a party achievement. If the United List succeeds in undermining changes to the pension system, it would kill several birds with one stone. Drnovsek would have to take out a loan with the commercial banks to patch up the hole in the budget, which would probably trigger increased interest rates and inflation as a consequence, while the United List would portray itself as the untouchable defender of the rights of pensioners."

Vasle also observes that, while the battle for the changes to the pensions legislation raged on in parliament, the Christian Democrats played the role of a "neutral observer in the conflict between the LDS and the ZLSD until the latter party refused to accept a compromise government proposal. Lojze Peterle then stated publicly that his party supported the government proposals and, within the coalition coordination, eagerly attacked Kocijancic and his party for violating the coalition agreement, which also constituted an attack on the budget, while, in the bilateral talks with Drnovsek, Peterle demanded that the United List be punished appropriately for violating the coalition agreement. Also, by being shown out of the coalition. Everything else was left to Drnovsek, who usually does not like crucial decisions. Otherwise, he would have kicked the Christian Democrats out a long time ago."

The outcome of this strife, as Vasle explains, was a double defeat for the United List, namely, apart from losing a minister, it also failed to block the changes to the pensions law and, simultaneously, a great victory for the Christian Democrats.

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Federal

FRY: Kontic Addresses Davos Summit on Sanctions

AU0602210796 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 6 Feb 96

[Speech by FRY Prime Minister Radoje Kontic at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on 6 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. President, respected ladies and gentlemen. I would like to say on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that I am very grateful to our respected host, President Mr. Schwab, for including in the agenda of this eminent meeting one of the crucial issues in international relations today—the prospects of peace and cooperation in the Balkans.

I would like to stress that peace has been and remains the top state and national interest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this context, the Yugoslav Government has supported all the five peace plans of the international community, from that of Cutilheiro to the Contact Group plan. I stress with pleasure that the Yugoslav delegation has made a significant contribution to the peace agreement reached in Dayton. I want to assure you that Yugoslavia will continue to invest maximum efforts aimed at the consistent realization of the peace agreements. We expect this kind of attitude from all the sides involved and from the international community.

Mr. President, I agree with the main motto of the Peace in the Balkans Forum that the paths to preserve the lasting peace lie in the economic reconstruction and cooperation among the countries that have emerged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in the Balkans as whole. I would like to stress Yugoslavia's commitment to the development of good-neighborly relations and all-round cooperation with all Balkan countries and the neighbors from further afield. Mutual respect, trust, and cooperation among the Balkan countries on an equal footing and respect of mutual interest and non-interference in internal affairs represent the correct path to strengthen peace and stability in the region.

The normalization of relations among the former Yugoslav republics is of a strategic, political, and economic importance for the stability of the Balkans. Faced with the challenges of the world processes of globalization and integration, the Balkan countries must find a joint answer through the settlement of outstanding issues within a broader platform of the Balkans to the Balkan peoples.

The responsibility for the common future should be borne above all by the Balkan peoples themselves. Past experience has taught us that the imposition of unilateral solutions has often led to clashes and conflicts in this region. Therefore, the harmonization and economic revival of the Balkans represent the right path to integration in Europe.

In view of this, it is necessary to lift, without delay, all trade and other restrictions imposed by the international community. We see the prosperity of the Balkans primarily in the integration of its area. This could be a customs union among the interested countries at the beginning. The expansion of the union would open up prospects for creating a joint and even a unified Balkan market.

Ladies and gentlemen, the talks about improving economic cooperation in the Balkans as a whole cannot ignore the fact that during the period of sanctions Yugoslavia lost about $50 billion directly and about $150 billion indirectly, despite the fact that the war was not waged on its territory. In the same period, gross national product [drustveni proizvod] per head fell from $2,500 to about $1,400. To form a picture of the catastrophic consequences of the sanctions and the war in the neighborhood, one should also bear in mind the economy's technical-technological retardation, the decrease in its competitiveness, the rise in social and health problems, and so forth. All Balkan and neighboring countries have been affected to a greater or lesser extent.

Because of the above mentioned factors, the reconstruction and development in the case of the Balkans are of exceptional importance and deserve the full attention of both the EU and the international development and financial institutions. Reconstruction and development should proceed without any discrimination and should apply to the area of the previous Yugoslavia and the region as whole. Only such an approach can ensure lasting stability.

The initiative of the World Economic Forum for the representatives of world business to take part in the peace process, believing that peace can be preserved only if it is supported with rapid economic and business development, deserves the greatest attention and support. Peace, and reconstruction and development, are in fact two sides of the same problem.

Ladies and gentlemen, I hope that you are aware that Yugoslavia has been developing a market model of economy, especially in the last 10 or so years. Despite the above-mentioned restrictions, it has been achieving significant results in doing so. Our economic system and economic policy are based on the model that exists in the developed market economies. Companies make their business decisions completely independently and bear all the consequences of their decisions. Many market institutions have been developed and are working. The

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functioning of the state has been adopted to that. We are essentially talking about a completely open market economy.

Yugoslavia has not abandoned its market orientation, not even under the sanctions, when many circumstances called for administrative measures and state interventionism. Thanks to that, two years ago we succeeded in checking mega-inflation and stabilizing the exchange rate of our currency and prices.

Mr. President, respected ladies and gentlemen, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an inseparable part of the Balkans and Europe. Establishing a lasting peace and stability in this region will not be possible without its full participation and contribution. Moreover, the active participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the processes of reintegration and development, which it wishes to do sincerely, is not possible without the final lifting of the international community's sanctions. The final lifting of the sanctions would represent the greatest contribution to the peace process.

It is also necessary for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take part in the work of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the international financial and trade organizations, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and other international organizations and institutions. Only in such conditions can Yugoslavia take part in the renewal of the regional cooperation and the development of the new European architecture on an equal footing. Only in such conditions can the Balkans become a region of peace, stability, and cooperation, which we wish sincerely indeed. Thank you. [applause]

FRY: Prime Minister Meets Bulgarian Counterpart

LD0602233496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2212 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Davos, Switzerland, Feb. 6 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic and his Bulgarian counterpart Jean Videnov agreed at a meeting in Davos on Tuesday that their countries' cooperation under the regime of international sanctions against Yugoslavia had been good.

They said the two countries should continue to strengthen cooperation and improve good-neighbourly relations in the Balkans. Kontic said Belgrade counted on Bulgaria's support in the process of Yugoslavia's full reintegration into the international community.

Videnov said Sofia was interested in joint projects with Yugoslavia in the areas of telecommunication and power industry.

FRY: POLITIKA Assesses Christopher's Belgrade Visit

LD0602215396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1259 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 6 (TANJUG)—The Belgrade daily POLITIKA said in a commentary on Tuesday that the Sunday visit to Belgrade by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher 'should give an impetus to a future promotion of bilateral relations and better understanding between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States.'

The U.S. secretary of state's first visit in five years is an indication that a full normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and the United States is in the offing, the daily said.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic told reporters that Christopher's visit was very important, and that it symbolized a change in relations between the two countries.

According to what Christopher told reporters, he warned his partners in talks in Zagreb and Sarajevo about the importance of preserving the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, human rights observation, and ensuring the return of refugees.

Regarding the possibility of a U.S. recognition of Yugoslavia, the daily quoted Christopher as saying that he was not ready to state the exact date, but that if friendly relations between the United States and Yugoslavia continued, they would be further promoted.

POLITIKA said that the U.S. secretary of state had been pleased to announce that with President Milosevic's agreement, the U.S. Information Service would open its office in Serbia's southern province of Kosovo-Metohija and that its office in Belgrade would continue working.

According to POLITIKA, Christopher and Milosevic stressed that the United States should open such offices in Novi Sad, Nis and other Yugoslav towns and that Yugoslavia should open such offices in New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Pittsburgh.

Christopher has undoubtedly confirmed again Washington's position that all disputed issues between the people in Kosovo-Metohija must and should be resolved in a dialogue with authorities in Belgrade, within Yugoslavia, POLITIKA said.

The situation is quite clear regarding cooperation with the Hague-based war crimes tribunal. Belgrade said a few months ago that all three sides in the civil war in Bosnia should be held equally responsible for war crimes, POLITIKA said.

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FRY: Training of Bosnian Muslims Arouses 'Suspicion'

LD0702125196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1235 GMT 7 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ankara, Feb. 7 (TANJUG)—Turkey and the United States will have the key role in the arming and training of the Bosnian Muslim army, sources in Ankara said on Wednesday.

The Istanbul daily CUMHURIYET said that a Pentagon delegation had arrived in Turkey two days ago to arrange details of the Bosnia military operation with its hosts.

With Washington's support, Ankara should have an important role in the training of Muslim troops and deliveries of arms and equipment, the daily said.

Sources quoted by CUMHURIYET said that the training of Muslim officers and soldiers would cost 100 million dollars and that arms and equipment would cost 300 million dollars.

Most of the funds will be secured by Gulf countries—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates—and the United States will also give part of the funds.

In cooperation with Ankara, which has traditional links with the Muslim government in Sarajevo, Washington is said to be trying to establish a balance of fear between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims for the time when NATO will withdraw from the region.

This explanation causes suspicion in the world, primarily in Russia and some Western countries that advocate the reduction of military arsenals in Bosnia, because the accumulation of arms may result in new conflicts.

FRY: DS's Djindjic Announces Opposition Meeting

AU0702112496 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by BETA: "Agreement on FRY's Destiny"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Democratic Party [DS] President Zoran Djindjic announced yesterday that a meeting of all opposition parties in the Federal Assembly will be held in Belgrade next week. The goal of the meeting will be to start an initiative on the destiny of Yugoslavia as a federal state.

Djindjic told the BETA agency that at that meeting, an agreement could be expected among the parliamentary opposition parties in Serbia and Montenegro on a "joint concept and issues for the election campaign, as well as the conceptual framework of a program for the better functioning of the federal state." The DS leader added that, apart from the DS, representatives of the Serbian Radical Party, the Serbian Renewal Movement, the People's Party, the Liberal Alliance, and the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro would probably participate in the meeting. Representatives of the Democratic Party of Serbia are also expected to attend.

"While expecting federal elections, we deem it essential for all the parties to coordinate their positions and not to waste energy on unnecessary and mutually conflicting moves," Djindjic said. In his view, the announced meeting is aimed to have the opposition parties resist "secret diplomacy and the shadow constitutionalists, who are now sending up trial balloons, that is, letting news leak about their intention to set up Yugoslavia without consulting anybody."

"Another goal of the meeting is to take this secret diplomacy away from the Socialists, to come before the people with the topic of Yugoslavia and its setup, as well as to demand that the Socialists explain how they see Yugoslavia."

Asked whether reports on a possible change to the Federal Constitution are reliable, Djindjic said that those best informed about that are the Kosovar Albanians because they themselves presented that idea two months ago. He reiterated that Yugoslav policy is not implemented by FRY bodies but in the halls of world cities. "Thus, since the Albanians have lobbies in these centers, we may say that these reports are relatively reliable," the leader of the Democrats said. "Something is obviously being prepared and we must oppose it, demanding an open and public debate on the appearance and setup of the future state," Djindjic concluded.

FRY: Opposition To Demonstrate in Belgrade on 9 Mar

LD0602202796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 6 Feb (TANJUG)—Vuk Draskovic, chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], today said the fifth anniversary of the 9 March 1991 demonstrations would be marked by demonstrations in the Republic Square in Belgrade on 9 March 1996.

"We will not respect the ban on gathering in the square because we can commemorate 9 March only where we were on 9 March five years ago," Draskovic said at a news conference, adding that "[we] do not want riots or any kind of violence."

Discussing joint activities of the opposition clubs of deputies in the Serbian parliament, that is "the parallel

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parliament," Draskovic stressed that SPO would neither compromise its program nor compromise with parties that believe violations of human rights are part of their program. [passage omitted]

FRY: 'Legal Vacuum' in Criminal Law Detailed

AU0702112696 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 p 5

[Article by Lj.V.: "Sentence According to the Date"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The toughest sentence in Serbia, even for war crimes that were committed no later than 22 July 1994, is 15 years in prison. Namely, anybody who would be proved to have committed such a crime has the right to invoke the principle of the application of the milder law ["primena blazeg zakona"], i.e. the legal vacuum that was created after the abolishment of the death penalty from the Federal Criminal Law.

The trial of Ljubisa Vrbanovic, the murderer of a four-member family, in the District Court in Kragujevac, proved the helplessness of the court that has to work according to laws full of "holes." Had Vrbanovic killed them on 23 July 1994, rather than in August of 1990, Judge Dragomir Milojevic would probably, applying the republic criminal law, award the toughest sentence. However in this case, the court had to apply the regulations of the federal criminal law, which provides that the accused be sentenced according to the mildest law, even if that law was in force for only one day. In the case of Vrbanovic, but in other cases as well, which would also include those who would be accused of war crimes, the applicable law is the one in force between 31 December 1993 and 22 July 1994.

On the last day of December 1993, the death penalty was erased from the federal criminal law. At the same time, the provision saying that the sentence awarded instead of the death penalty is 20 years in prison was also erased. The death penalty was introduced in the republic criminal law six months later, so that anybody threatened by the death penalty can invoke this law for crimes committed before the new criminal law of Serbia came into force.

Those accused of war crimes also have the right to the application of the milder law, but those who committed war crimes after 22 July 1994 would be liable according to federal law, which has special regulations for those criminal deeds. For the criminal acts of genocide, crime against the civilian population, against the wounded and prisoners of war, the federal law anticipates a sentence of 20 years in prison, whereas the organizing of groups and inciting them to commit war crimes is punishable by 15 years in prison.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rights Activist Suggests 'Balkania' Federation

AU0602155196 Paris AFP in English 1504 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Yugoslavia, Feb 6 (AFP)—The Serbian province of Kosovo "should become independent of Serbia," a leading human rights activist in Kosovo declared Tuesday.

But Adem Demaci, chairman of the Human Rights Committee of Kosovo, where 90 percent of the population is Albanian, said "the Albanians of Kosovo themselves have to fight for it."

An increasingly popular opponent of Serbia, who spent 28 years in prison there, he urged Albanians to fight for their independence, but not through war. He compared the cause to that of Chechnya and the Palestinian intifada.

"It is high time for us to change our strategies. We must create havoc in the Serbia regime, and let the world know that we are determined and able to establish a state of our own," he said.

He emphasized that autonomy was not enough for Kosovo and that nothing short of independence would do.

Demaci advocated the idea of creating a federation which he called "Balkania," grouping Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo.

Demaci has recently emerged as the rival of Belgrade's main opposition leader, Ibrahim Rugova, who was elected president in what Serbia called an "illegal" vote in May 1992. Two years earlier, Kosovo had unilaterally declared independence.

Kosovo has always been Serbia's trouble spot. Serbia, however, considers Kosovo the cradle of Serbian history.

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